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In the decade of the 1830's, Alexis de Tocqueville
published a perceptive analysis of America in the Jacksonian
era, which focused upon the customs, manners and intellectQal habits of its citizens, and their social condition as
seen through its political institutions.

He advanced the

proposition--a paradox of democracy--that equality of condition was as compatible with tyranny as with freedom.

The

social consensus, which stemmed from the wide acceptance of
doctrine of equality and common wants and interests, when

2

brought to bear upon legislator and judge, public official,
juryman, and the non-conforming individual, he termed the
"tyranny of the majority."
This historical investigation of Tocqueville's majoritarian thesis concentrates upon those points of social tension which are most effectively displayed in one locus of
their final resolution, the court system, where, he believed,
the judiciary functioned as a powerful bulwark against the
excesses of democracy.

The judicial opinions of four state

supreme courts, which have been selected for their geographical and political balance--Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania and Tennessee--are examined for the years
1835-45, that followed immediately upon the publication of
his treatise.

Specifically, judicial restraint of the aspir-

ations of the assertive, self-confident and politically
alert Americans who represented the majority in the legislatures or through the jury system, or claimed, as individuals,
certain vested rights, is reviewed.
The results suggest that, in this period of opportunism and dynamic change, the people's prerogative to interpret the law through jury trial received chilly scrutiny;
that the concern of the bench was for stable rules to regulate emergent forms of enterprise, and particular interests
of individuals, for the good order and harmony of the nation,
though their decisions might overturn the political judgment
of the majority.

By the end of the period, the judiciary

had made a decisive stand regarding the nature and locality

3
of supreme authority, limiting majoritarian encroachments
upon vested rights in politics, economics and property.

The

courts did not, however, safeguard minority rights that
impinged upon majoritarian views which the judges shared.
In the despotism of this accord--a paradox of Tocqueville's
thesis--lies the tyranny of the majority.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Searching for the universal principles which govern
egalitarian societies, so that he might resolve the political conundrum of his time (whether society were more justly
ruled by the few or by the many) , Alexis de Tocqueville visited America in the early 1830's.

There he found an image

of democracy which kindled his approbation, quickened his
apprehension, and inspired a major interpretation of the
American experience.

In words as cogent as the biblical

phrases echoed, he wrote:

"The people reign in the American

political world as the Deity does in the universe.

They are

the cause and the aim of all things; everything comes from
them, and everything is absorbed in them." 1 Was
Tocqueville's assessment an accurate depiction of Jacksonian
America, or did it but reflect the prevalent hue of popular
sentiment?
To evaluate points of social tension, to discern what
each generation thought of the relationship of the individual to the state, and the value placed on liberty--to test
the validity of Tocqueville's thesis--judicial opinion

1
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democrac! in America, ed.
Phillips Bradley (New York, 1966), I, 8.

2

provides rich insights.

This discussion focuses on the

supreme court records of four states:

Massachusetts, New

York, Pennsylvania and Tennessee, which provide geographical
representation and a measure of political equilibrium.

Both

the Massachusetts and Tennessee courts had predominantly
Whig leanings; in the other two states Democratic jurists
we=e in the majority.

The years 1835-45, which witnessed

the dynamic advancement of the country in size and material
well-being, in technology and business organization, demand
particular scrutiny, as both political parties had the
opportunity to respond to the age of egalitarianism in the
determination of national policy. 2 Broadly, the evidence
suggests that, though the function of politics was to secure
to the majority the control and influence to which they were
entitled in a democracy, the bench,

allegedly an apolitical

agency of government, defeated what it perceived to be popular errors, in the interests of political, social, and economic doctrines to which the judiciary adhered.

This is not

to suggest a complete failure of justice, for the courts
provided the vehicle for what Tocqueville would call "the
slow and quiet action of society upon itself , 113 whereby
minorities could secure the reconsideration of majority
decisions.
In this first decade following the publication of
2
Richard P. McCormick, "New Perspectives on Jacksonian
Politics," American Historical Review, 65 (1960), 300.
3
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 416.

3

Tocqueville's critique, the sturdy republic, its revolutionary heritage enshrined in its basic institutions, was "far
out upon a democratic course. 114

As he had recorded, the

nation had advanced steadily towards universal white manhood
suffrage, the substitution of a tax qualification or service
in the military, for property provisions, giving the impetus
to practical democracy. 5

Annual popular elections for the

legislature and governor in most states compelled respect
for the delegated trust. 6 Applying fundamental Jacksonian
notions to the judiciary, the people, through their representatives, regulated judicial salaries and dictated the
duration of appointments; in 1846, New York's constitutional
revisions initiated the popular election of judges.

Indeed,

legislative hegemony was repeatedly demonstrated by the
exercise of other "judicial" powers:

legislative divorces

were ~ranted, marriages validated and dowers awarded, wills
rejected by the courts were admitted to probate, mortgages
were foreclosed, the administration of estates dictated,
4
Marvin Meyers, The Jacksonian Persuasion (Stanford,
1957)' 4.
5
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II, 351; Harold M.
Hyman and William M. wiecek, E ual Justice under Law:
Constitutional Development 1835-1875 (New York, 1982 , 8.
6
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 83-5, 154.

4

and, until 1846, appellate jurisdiction was exercised by the
New York senate. 7
The democratization of investment opportunities was

secured by regulations for accountability in corporate charters, and the adoption of general incorporation acts after
1830. 8

Disestablishment, which promoted religious liberty,

was effected in Massachusetts by means of a constitutional
amendment. 9 The legislatures responded, too, to reform
movements, abolishing imprisonment for debt, modifying
severe penalties reminiscent of eighteenth century justice,
and improving the prison system, 10 thus furnishing
Tocqueville and his companion with an official reason, and
the means, to visit the United States on behalf of the
7

Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 255: Bernard
Schwartz, The Law in America: a History (New York, 1974),
68; Carl B. Swisher, History of the Supreme Court in the
United States, The Taney Period (Vol. V) (New York, 1974),
206, 209: After the successful victory over the life judiciary in Pennsylvania in 1839, and the reduction of state
judicial salaries in Massachusetts in 1842, efforts were
made to eliminate life tenure and lower the salaries of federal judges, including the Supreme Court, in 1842-3, though
this would have required a constitutional amendment.
Despite the expansion of responsibility due to the increasing burden of circuit duties as the country grew, the new
positions for associate justices notwithstanding, the stipend of Supreme Court justices remained unchanged from 1819
to 1855.
8
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston,
1945), 337.

9
Leonard w. Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and
Chief Justice Shaw (New York, 1957), 42.
10

Hyman and Wiecek, Equal Justice under Law, 47-50.
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French government. 11

Observing the prolific exuberance of

legislative activity, Tocqueville wrote:
The authority exercised by the legislatures is supreme.
Nothing prevents them from accomplishing their wishes

with celerity and with irresistable power, and they are
supplied with new representatives every year.12
The election of Jackson to the presidency in 1828 and
1832, which broke the "chain of decorous successions," 13
confirmed the popularity principle.

Tocqueville, whose

sympathies were pro-Whig, wrote:
General Jackson, whom the Americans have twice elected
to be the head of their government, is a man of violent
temper and very moderate talents; nothing in his whole
career ever proved him qualified to govern a free people. 14
Yet it was precisely Jackson's scorn of "privilege," or
aristocratic pretensions, which drew forth the people's
favour.

By establishing as a practice the system of rota-

tion in office, Jackson extended democratic participation in
government, demonstrating both his faith in the people as
the "bone and sinew of the country," 15 and the fear that
prolonged off ice-holding could become linked with economic
11 James T. Schleifer, The Making of Tocqueville's
Democracy in America (Chapel Hill, 1980), 3. Tocqueville's
fellow-traveller was Gustave de Beaumont.
12
. America,
.
Tocquevi·11 e, Democracy in
I, 257 •
13
Meyers, The Jacksonian Persuasion, 12.
14 T

. America,
.
ocquevi·11 e, Democracy in
I, 289 •

15
James o. Richardson, A Com,ilation of Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, 1789-189 (Washington, 1896), III,
365. However, hardly insulated from party politics, the
rotation doctrine was generally qualified by political tenet
and personal loyalty.
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power.

Indeed, any disposition towards exclusiveness by

elitist groups repugnant to the democratic man, such as the
professions, was rendered ineffective by the redefinition of
professional standards, by the legislatures, through the
scaling down of educational requirements.

This, and the

leveling influence of the frontier, gave to Jacksonian society the egalitarian cast which Tocqueville noted as his most
"forcible" observation. 16
Consistent with these circumstances was the renewal,
under the Democratic party, of the movement for legal reform,
a reinvocation of Jefferson's old agrarian vision of a society based upon hard work, honest industry and moderate
rewards.

Antilegalism in the early nineteenth century was

"more pervasive than either of the parties could control,
.
d eep, a t avis
. t ic,
.
.
. t h e community.
.
"1 7
some th ing
persistent
in
It represented a belief in man's natural, reasonable and
equitable instincts, his "beautiful and unerring sense of
justice," and the conviction that law should be relatively
simple and comprehensible. 18 It reflected the "strong
strand" of middle class antipathy which had developed among
merchants of the colonial period, because of legal hostility
to their cheaper and speedier extra-judical arbitration
16

Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 3.

17 Perry Miller, The Life of· the Mind in America:
the Revolution to the Civil War (New York, 1965), 103.
18Mi· 11 er, The Life of the Mind
.
. America,
.
in
102.

from

7

settlements, which had been self-regulated. 19

It illus-

trated an antagonism, inherited from the colonial experience,
to the use of customary or common law, because of its
English origin, and the belief that the law as imported was
unnecessari·1 y comp 1 ex. 20 The law, it was said, should be
"of indigenous growth, 1121 "foreign and heathenish words" 22
(Latin) should be dispensed with, so that an ignorant or
inattentive lawyer would not misapply one of the various
phrases by which suits at law were designated.

Distrust of

legal technicalities involved not only procedure, but fear
of professional cunning and "legal chicanery," 23 which might
manifest itself in the manipulation of society by clever
lawyers and judges, and concern lest paid advocacy should
blight man's moral impulse.
Tocqueville, who was himself a lawyer, wrote:
Nothing can be more obscure and strange to the uninitiated than a legislation founded on precedents • • •
19Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American
Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge, 1977), 146.
20
"The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth
Century," Yale Law Journal, 74 (1964), 180, n. 63. See also
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American
People (Princeton, 1970), 200-33: This anti-British enmity
was exacerbated by periodic problems concerning the nation's
northern borders, and involved the sensitive issue of slavery. Besides affecting Southern sensibilities, the British
attempts to crush the African slave trade intensified
America's concern over a possible abuse of maritime rights.
21
Mark De Wolfe Howe, ed., Readings in American Legal
History (Cambridge, 1949), 472.
22
Charles M. Haar, The Golden Age of American Law
(New York, 1965), 230.
23
Miller, The Life of the Mind in America, 186.
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the American lawyer resembles the heirophants of Egypt,
fo: like ~hem he is the sole interpreter of an occult
science. 2
For some American practioners of the law,

not only

Democrats, though they were the more severe, such censure of
the machinery of justice was warranted.

They are best

represented by Robert Rantoul of Massachusetts.

Crusading

for the simplification and codification of the laws, he condemned the common law as having its origin in "folly, barbarism and feudality," and charged that judge-made law, based
on a "chain of precedents," was judicial legislation,
post facto law, indefinite and vague.

~

The judiciary "not

only usurps the confines of legislation, but runs riot
beyond it," he said, "subversive of the fundamental principles of free government."

The remedy was to remodel the

great body of the law, merge the procedures of law and
equity, and enact the result in the form of statutes, for
"statutes speak the public voice." 25

Other lawyers sought

to give to the reform of law a systemic basis and legislative sanction.

In 1825, Edward Livingston completed four

26 wh"1c h , wh en co d'f"
. .
.
co d es f or the state o f Louisiana,
1 1cat1on
24
Tocqueville, Demo·cracy in America, I, 277. Miller,
in The Life of the Mind in America, 186, uses this quotation
in the context of legal morality. As Tocqueville fraternised with Whig intellectuals, many of whom were lawyers, it
seems that he intended rather to infer that ~~erican jurisprudence as a system was chaotic, compared with the French,
an achievement of the Napoleonic Codes.
25
26

Howe, Readings in American Legal History, 474-8.

Haar, The Golden Age of American Law, 268-9; Swisher,
The Taney Period, 34.

9

activity spread, were circulated throughout the country,
finding greater acceptance in the new states of the west,
though statutory revisions were enacted in Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania in the 1830's.

27

In New York, the first code

of David Dudley Field, the state's leading codification advocate, was approved in 1848. 28
Pondering upon the overwhelming authority of the majority in Arnerica, 29 Tocqueville decided that its basis lay in
annual elections, in the right of electors in certain states
to require

their representatives submit to mandates, in

th~t

the legislative domination over the executive branch, and in
the reach of the people into the sphere

~f

judicial independence through salary and tenure adjustments. 30 The moral
authority of the majority lay in their collective intelligence and wisdom, was enlarged by the wide acceptance of the
doctrine of equality, 31 and a sense of community, or harmony
of interests, which their history and traditions nourished.
Several important results followed.

Instability of the laws,

27

Charles Warren, A History of· the American Bar (New
York, 1939), 528.
28
swisher, The Taney Period, 344.
29 T
. in
. America,
.
I , 57 : " Th e
ocquevi ll e, Democracy
principle of the sovereignty of the people has acquired in
the United States all the practical development that the
imagination can conceive. • • • The people reign without
impediment."
30 rbid., I, 254-5, 154.
0

31

rbid., I, 393: Not only its ideological foundation,
but basic education (I, 316) and material prosperity (I,
292-3) enhanced this sentiment of equality.
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and variations in their administration, mirrored the fluetuating membership of the dominant branch of the government. 32

The politically viable figure, or the popular

writer, was he who conformed, and reinforced society in its
assumptions of superiority. 33
"Unlimited power is in itself a bad and dangerous
thing," wrote Tocqueville.

Seeing the "irresistible

strength" of the democratic institutions in America, he
believed that he detected a "germ of tyranny," for to whom
could an individual or a minority apply for guarantees
against the abuse by the many of its authority?
If to public opinion, public opinion constitutes the
majority; if to the legislature, it represents the
majority and implicitly obeys it; if to the executive
power, it is appointed by the majority and serves as a
passive tool in its hands. The public force consists of
the majority under arms, the jury is the majority
invested with the right of hearing judicial cases, and in
certain states even the judges are elected by the majority. 34
However, wrote Tocqueville, the potentially despotic
pressure of public opinion was diminished by the absence of
a centralized administration (because of federalism), by the
32
Ibid., I, 258, 262, 206: In discussing the frequency of elections and the "perpetual mutability" of the
law, Tocqueville at first suggested that an instinctive
taste for variety, a "characteristic passion," had guided
popular rule. Later, he exposed democracy's negative concept of government: "The people in America obey the law not
only because it is their own work, but because it may be
changed if it is harmful; a law is observed because, first,
it is a self-imposed evil, and, secondly, it is an evil of
short duration."
33
Ibid., I, 265-6.
34
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 261, 416.
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division of the states' authority into counties and municipalities, and by the very vastness of the nation, so that
natural sanctuaries of liberty could exist in "concealed
breakwaters. 1135

Further, the tyranny of the majority was

mitigated by the predominance of the legal profession.

The

prominence of this ubiquitious group was assured by education, and by opportunities in both private law and public
service, where social adjustments were made in legal terms,
to infiltrate the whole community.

Cautious, orderly, and

conservative by training, they checked the passions and
impetuosity inherent in popular government, assuming for
themselves the role of preserving the fabric of society. 36
Finally, though he had praised the jury as an "eminently
republican element in the government, 1137 he proffered it as
a co-agency, with the legal profession, in "moderating the
movements of the people," for, by sanctioning the decision
of the court in civil cases, jurors promoted the judge's
responsible role, and transmitted into the community the
principles whereby the law promoted the ends of justice. 38
Did the judiciary function as a limit upon majoritarian tyranny?

Points of tension between the people's compe-

tence as jurors, to interpret the law, as legislators, to
resolve social problems, and as individuals, to regulate
their interests responsibly, and the judicial conception of
35
37

Ibid., I, 87-89, 271-2, 290.

36

Ibid.

38

I

I

I

282.

Ibid., I, 270-80.
Ibid., I, 385-6.
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harmonious social progress, are effectively displayed in the
Supreme Court records of Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania and Tennessee.

Highly representative cases,

though not every conceivable case, in the decade following
the publication of Democracy in America, are discussed in
the ensuing pages, to test Tocqueville's thesis that majoritarian tyranny was implicit in the American conception of
democracy.

CHAPTER II
The Judiciary and the Jury
Tocqueville regarded the institution of the jury as
an eminently republican institution, "as direct and as
extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the people as
universal suffrage."

As potent as the suffrage privilege,

because it applied and sanctioned the laws by punishing
transgressors, it was "that portion of the nation to which
the execution of the laws was entrusted," and was imbued
with the "notion of right."

Viewing Americans as strikingly

litigious, he applauded the system as a "gratuitious public
school, ever open" which prepared the people for exercising
the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, and cultivated an acquaintance with the law.

An essential element in

criminal trials, it balanced the power of the judiciary and
its potential to oppress with the competence of the people. 1
Yet, he also saw the jury as a major check on majoritarian despotism.

In civil cases, he argued, the judge,

because of his commanding role, exercised an intellectual
domination over the jury, who, in turn, while augmenting the
1

To~queville,

Democracy in America, I, 280-3.

14

practical knowledge of the community, enhanced his moral
2
authority by sanctioning his decision.
The tension revealed in this dramatic shift in the
relationship of judge and jury in Tocqueville's assessment
of criminal and civil trials is augmented by his perception
of a "germ of tyranny" in the jury, which, as an agency of
government, could perpetrate specific acts of oppression
against minorities and dissenting individuals. 3
What, then, was the status of trial by jury in 1835?
By custom, the American colonists had settled the problems of pioneer populations on both civil and criminal matters through simple arbitration procedures, or lay referees
performed limited regulatory roles while juries, judging
transgressions by absolute moral standards, decided questions of both law and fact. 4 The public cherished the basic
assumption that legal experts were unnecessary; that Every
man might safely act as his own lawyer while society stood
ready to protect his legal rights.

The glowing promises of

social justice, once British power was overthrown, were protected in the republican creed.

Therefore, where the repub-

lic remained primarily an undeveloped agricultural area, the
traditional conception that the jury had the right to decide
questions of law was recognized and accepted, but generally
only in criminal cases.
2
4

Ibid., I, 284-7.

For, as redress to the civil law
3 Ibid., I, 260.

Howe, "Juries as Judges of Criminal Law," 591.

15
was beyond the reach of most people because of cost and
delay, and cases were seldom notorious, judges had been
able, unobtrusively, to narrow the province of the jury in
civil actions, and, in some areas, to eliminate it.
This was demonstrated in commercial litigation, particularly in the port cities of Philadelphia, Boston and New
York. 5 The use of extra-judicial means of settlement
through arbitration, during the colonial period, had enabled
merchants to avoid lengthy and extensive lawsuits before a
professional bar not yet attuned to commercial interests. 6
However, because of the growing number of appeals from arbito the state courts, judges, by finding technical

trat~on

deficiencies, were able to subvert this system, and, by 1800
marine insurance cases had become the mainstay of commercial
lawyers. 7 The expedient identification of commercial law
with natural law principles, or the "general law of nations,"
marked the beginning of a possible alliance between the mercantile classes and the legal profession, 8 and the question
of the control of juries took on a new significance.

To

resolve the dichotomy between the jury's equitable inquiry
and certainty, an essential element of economic planning,
judges employed two procedural devices:
5

the "special case,"

Horwitz, The T·ransformation of American Law, 141.

6

rbid., 145-6. Arbitration committees were generally
establiS'li'eCi by Chambers of Commerce.
7

Ibid., 141. One of Hamilton's first cases terminated
in a damage judgment of $120,000.
8

Ibid., 144.

16
which reserved points of law for the bench, and the reversal
9
of jury verdicts "contrary to the weight of evidence."
As Alexander Hamilton had admitted in 1787, a gradual
but significant erosion of the jury's role in civil cases
had occurred.

There was a "material diversity" in the

extent of the institution in the state courts in these
actions (in New York, courts of admiralty, probate and chancery proceeded without the aid of a jury); he expressed
"doubts as to [its] essentiality • • • to liberty" in civil
cases, where questions were, he believed, "too complicated"
for its effective use.

However, he assured the people of

New York that, though the Constitutional Convention had
failed to protect jury trial in civil cases, it was seen as
a "valuable safeguard to liberty • • • and a very palladium
of free government." 10
During the first few decades of the nineteenth century,
the courts of New York generally left questions of law to
.
.
.
. . 1 cases. 1 1
. .
th e d ecisions
o f Juries
in
a 11 crimina

Between

1835 and 1845, in the only case which pertained to the
9Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 142.
The first in Pennsylvania occurred in 1788, and in New York
in 1799, both to overturn jury verdicts against marine
insurers.
10
The Federalist No. 83, ed. Clinton Rossiter, (New
York, 1961), 499, 506, 509. Hamilton pointed to legislative
authorization of the jury's decline in these fields.
11
Howe, "Juries as Judges of Criminal Law," 580, n. 26.

17

jury's right to determine the law and the fact, 12 the
supreme court predicted that a procedural change would
demand a sharp distinction between law and fact, and a cor-

responding separation of function between judge and jury.
People v. Rathbun (1839) concerned an indictment for forgery.
In the trial court, the judge, before submitting the case to
the jury for their decision on both the law and the fact,
had reviewed the evidence, some of it circumstantial.

The

defendant's counsel objected to his summation, perceiving a
distortion which did not favour his client, and presented a
lengthy list of errors. Justice Esek Cowen, for the
Democratic court, 13 explained the principle by which a remedy by bill of exceptions, a recent refinement by statute,
could be introduced.

Criminal law allowed review by bill of

exceptions of legal questions, he said, and conclusions from
fact by the judge were to be taken as merely advisory to the
jury, who were the "tribunal to correct the error$, in point
12 F. N. Thorpe, ed., The Federal and State
Constitutions, Colonial Charters and other Organic Laws of
the States, Territories and Colonies now and heretofore
forming in the United States of America (Washington, 1909),

1648.

13
rn this period the court consisted of John Savage,
Chief Justice - Democrat (C clopaedia of American Biograph ,
Appleton and Company, 1888, V,
; Samue Ne son, C ie
Justice - Democrat (Dictionary of American Biography, VII,
422); Green c. Bronson, Chief Justice (1845) - Democrat
(Appleton's, I, 384)1 Freeborn G. Jewett and Esek Cowen,
both of whom remain elusive, though the latter's brother was
a leader of the Whigs in upper New York in the 1840's and
was also a lawyer (National Cyclotaedi·a of American
Biography, XII, 58). The Chancel or was Reuben H. Walworth
- Democrat (Dictionary of American Biography, x, 406).

18

of fact, both of the judge and counsel." 14

Deeming the

errors to be factual, "frivolous • • • or irrelevant," 15 he
added that, though it appeared to the defendant's counsel

that the trial judge's charge to the jury was more than an
advisory declaration on the facts, the judge had concluded
by resigning the case to the jury upon every point of law
and fact.

This was "more favorable for the prisoner than

. d • .. 16
some b oo k s require

. .
s v. Battis
. t e. 17 wh ere i•t
Citin9
u ••

was held that the instructions of the court upon the matter
of law were conclusive upon the jury, he declared that this
decision now had "additional force under a system of criminal law which allows a review by a bill of exceptions of the
legal questions. 1118
Pennsylvania's constitutional provision gave the jury
the right to determine the law and the fact under the direction of the court, in indictments for libel and other
cases. 19

The meaning of libel in the jury clause is associ-

ated with the highly partisan dispute over the passage of
the federal Sedition Act of 1798, which supposed that the
government could be criminally assaulted by the expression
of critical views.

Pushed through by the extreme wing of

the Federal party, this statute, they claimed, liberalized
the traditional law of seditious libel by permitting truth
14

21 Wendell, 548.

16 Ibid., 526.

15

Ibid. I 547.

17 2 Sumner, 240 (1835).

18

21 Wendell, 526-7.

19

Thorpe, ed.,· Federa·1 ·and State· Constitutions, 3122.
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as a defense, and by allowing the jury to decide whether an
utterance were libelous.

For the traditional or common law,

which had been incorporated in the First Amendment, merely

prohibited censorship prior to publication, permitting subsequent discipline for licentious or seditious abuse, truth
providing no protection, and the judge having sole power to
determine the crucial question of whether the defendant's
remarks were libelous, or of a bad tendency.
guered Republicans,

The belea-

attacking the act as unconstitutional,

asserted that the First Amendment had outlawed seditious
libel.

Therefore, the jury had the power to determine the

ultimate legal question of the substantive meaning of a statute, but was bound to follow the court's opinion in matters
concerning evidence and constitutionality. 20 This seems to
have been the accepted practice in Pennsylvania from its
early years. 21
Judicial dicta during the first half of the nineteenth
century suggest, however, that judges were bringing a new
policy orientation towards the jury's role.

Kalb's Case

(1835) had reference to an act of 1815, which provided for
the holding of a special court in divorce cases.

Counsel

had implied that the act required courts only where a jury
was necessary to determine a suit.
20

Justice John Kennedy,

aowe, "Juries as Judges of Criminal Law," 587.

21 Ibid., 595.

20
for the Democratic court, 22 ruled that:
As the province of the jury is only to decide on the
facts and not the law of the case, it is obvious that in
every case where the parties agree as to the facts of
it, a jury is unnecessary, and that the action must be
tried and decided by the court alone.23
Again, in Sypher v. Long (1835), an action for debt on a
note under seal, Chief Justice John Gibson, asserting that
it was an error to charge a jury to find a fact without evidence, added:

"In what is called, in other respects, a

'hard case,' juries are often sufficiently prompt to break
through the law, without the suggestion of a pretext for
i' t •

.. 24

In Brown v. Brown (1837), the trial court had submitted as a matter of fact to the jury the division of property
by a will.

Justice Kennedy objected to the ruling by the

jury, hinting that justice characteristic of jury determinations was rough, informal, and arbitrary.

Where the jury

had established a crooked line, he said, a straight line was
obviously indicated, and would prevent subsequent strife and
litigation.

He believed it to be the duty of the court to

interpret instruments of writing where precision and certainty were required.

He feared that a jury would be

22
Pennsylvania's court consisted of John B. Gibson,
Chief Justice (Dictionary of National Biography, IV, 254);
Molton C. Rogers and Charles Huston, who, like Gibson, were
appointed by Governor Shulze, Democrat, in the 1820's
(National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, XIV, 39, 145);
John Kennedy, who was appointed by Shulze in 1830 (Who was
Who in America, 1607-1898, 48), and Thomas Sergeant,
Democrat (Dictionary of American Biography, VIII, ii, 590).
23
24 .
Watts, 156.
Ibid., 254.

21

tempted to make "the most accommodating partition of the
land between the parties • • • according to their notions of
what might have been the intention of the testator," or
might "equalize the bounty • • • believing that it would
2
have been just as equitable in him to have done so." S
In 1837, the court intimated that the law was becoming
so complex that interpretations, even of facts, were becoming a matter for professionals.

In Yater v. Sanna, Chief

Justice Gibson found that though it was usually the business
of the jury to deal with presumptions of mere fact, because
they were now of growing importance in the evaluation of
evidence, they were "conclusions from experience, 1126 upon
which the court ought to adjudicate.

He reversed the jury's

finding that a "lost" paid prize ticket for a lottery, now
lapsed, was not sufficiently accounted for; payment must be
assumed.
The provisions in the 1834 Constitution of Tennessee
concerning the jury gave them "in all indictments for libels
• • • a right to determine the law and the facts, under the
direction of the court, as in other criminal cases." 27 This
was a verbatim repetition of the clause in Pennsylvania's
Declaration of Rights, with the addition of the word "criminal," and the insertion suggested that its source could lie
2 S6 Watts, SS.
26 6 Watts, 16S.
27 Thorpe, ed., Federal and State Constitutions, 3428.
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in Fox's Libel Act. 28

If this Libel Act were applicable in

the Tennessee constitutional provision, the words "under the
directon of the court" referred to the court's instructions
upon the legal question of the defendant's guilt or innocence.

The following cases concerning the jury's role in

Tennessee reflect the confusions concerning the source of
the provision, and ambiguities inherent in its interpreta.
29
t ion.

McGowan v. State (1836) was a case against gaming.
The defendant's counsel charged that, among other errors,
the trial judge had erred in claiming that the court was the
judge of the law, and that the jury must receive the law as
expounded by the court.

He believed it to be an accepted

practice in the state that the jury, "sworn to make a true
deliverance between the state and the accused," had the
power to render a general verdict of not guilty, and, as no
tribunal could contest the decision, the legal power admitted the legal right. 30 Wise juries would exercise this
28 Howe, "Juries as Judges of Criminal Law," 585.

Under
the common law, the jury had passed only upon the fact of
publication, while the judge decided the question of whether
the defendant's remarks were libelous. Fox's Libel Act was
a reforming English statute of 1792 which gave to the jury
the right to pronounce the verdict "under the directions of
the court." It had, however, received two conflicting interpretations: that, in prosecutions for libel, as in all criminal cases, the jury might find a verdict upon the whole
matter of the defendant's guilt or innocence, or, that it
was the jury's duty to follow the instructions of the court
upon all questions of law.
29

Ibid., 588, 598-600.

30 9 Yerger, 191.
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power circumspectly, and, to counter the oppression of corrupt judges, must find against a court which they believed
to be wrong.

Such power was given by the Constitution.

If

the jury did not have the right to judge the law, counsel
could not argue the law before them, and the accused would
be denied the right of full defense.
Justice William Reese 31 sustained the trial court's
instruction that the "court was to be the judge of the law,
and the jury exclusively the judges of matters of fact, and
it was the duty of the jury to receive the law as laid down
and expounded by the court," but he described these words as
"perhaps inaccurate, and may be, too strong." 32 The jury
were not the exclusive judges of the facts, he said, for the
court could set aside a guilty verdict if, on appraisal, it
appeared that the conclusion belied the weight of evidence.
Quoting Justice Samuel Putnam, in Commonwealth v. Knapp, 33
however, he gave the jury discretionary power to be guided
by the court in matters of law, but, "when the jury undertake to decide the law, in opposition to the advice of the
court, they assume a high responsibility, and should be very
31 In early 1835, the state's Superior Court consisted
of John Catron, Chief Justice, Jacob Peck and Nathan Green,
all chosen by the Jacksonian legislature in the 1820's
(Swisher, The Taney Period, 60). In December, 1835, the
Supreme Court was established by statute, and Green was
joined by William B. Turley and William B. Reese, all
appointed by Governor Cannon, who was a Whig (Stanley F.
Flomsbee, Robert E. Corlew, Enoch L. Mitchell, Tennessee, a
Short History (Knoxville, 1969), 192.
32
9 Yerger, 194-5.
33
10 Pickering, 495 (1830).
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careful to see c 1 ear 1 y t h at t h ey are rig

With this

admonition, he affirmed the decree.
The following year, Justice Nathan Green, in Dale v.

State, sustaining a judgment of murder against Dale in the
circuit court, re-affirmed, after "mature consideration,"
the opinion of the court in McGowan, which he regarded as
"substantially correct." 3 S He denied the bill of exceptions
artfully presented by the defendant's counsel, who had drawn
from the trial judge a view, while the jury was in seclusion,
which differed from the statement of the court in McGowan.
The court was obviously disapproving, but not yet prepared to deny the jury's right conclusively.

By 1842, how-

ever, the court, through Justice Reese, claimed that it was
"too obviously correct to be drawn into question or argument," 36 that the jury were not the judges of the law, and
that the insistence of the defendant's counsel that the jury
were at liberty to disregard the law as given to them by the
court was a proposition "of dangerous tendency • • • and not
permitted by the laws of the state. 1137

The court had come

to the conclusion, it seems, that only clear ·instructions to
juries, necessary to prevent "novel" interpretations of the
law, would "secure the repose of society. 1138
The right of the jury to determine the law in the colany of Massachusetts had been recognized in criminal cases,
34 9 Yerger, 195 (1836).
3 s10 Yerger, SSS.
36
3 Humphreys 277, Mccorry v. King's Heirs.
37
38 Ibid., 276.
Ibid., 270.
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though it remained inconclusive in civil cases.

39

In 1808,

however, the legislature affirmed the jury's common law
right to decide, at their discretion, both the law and the
. t • 40
f act, b y a genera 1 ver d ic
interpreted by the courts,

This statute, which was never

clearly to have been
reflected in Commonwealth v. Knapp 41 and Commonwealth v.
see~s

Kneeland.

In the latter case, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw,
for the predominantly Whig court, 42 stated that, in criminal

cases, "by the form in which the issue is made up, the jury
pass upon the whole matter of law and fact." 43
In 1839, the court appears to have moved towards a
more authoritative role.

In that year, Democratic Justice

Marcus Morton rejected the plea of defendant's counsel that
the issue of probable cause was a mixed question, involving
both law and fact, which ought to be submitted to the jury.
In Stone v. Crocker, he stated that, to have taken the opinion of the jury as to whether certain facts and circumstances amounted to probable cause, would have been to
obtain their judgment on a pure question of law.

This would

have confounded the functions of judge and jury, which
should be kept as distinct as possible. 44
3

SThe Changing Role of the Jury," 174, n. 27.
40
41
Ibid., 174.
10 Pickering 495 (1830).
42
The Massachusetts court during this period consisted
of Lemuel Shaw, Chief Justice, Samuel Putnum, Samuel Wilde,
Charles Dewy, Samuel Hubbard, and Richard Fletcher, all
Whigs, and Marcus Morton, Democrat (Levy, The Law of the
Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw, 337-8).
43 20 p· k .
44 4 .
.
ic ering 222 (1838) •
2 Pickering
84.
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In 1845, in an action involving the liquor license
laws, Justice Charles Dewey upheld the trial judge's finding
that it was the province of the court to rule upon the mean-

ing of statutes, and the duty of the jury to follow the ruling of the court on a question of law, which, in the case at
hand, involved a judgment as to whether the addition of
water and sugar added to gin made it less "spiritous."

The

jury, however, had the power to return such verdict as they
45
saw fit, even against the instructions of the court.
This decision was further amplified in Commonwealth v.
Porter (1845) where the defendant was charged with having
violated a statute forbidding innkeepers from selling intoxicating liquors.

The trial judge had instructed the jury

that, though they possessed the power of rendering a general
verdict in opposition to the court's ruling, and would be
free of attaint, 46 they would be over-ruled and reversed.
Porter's counsel contended that power and right were "convertible terms; 1147 that if the law gave the jury power to
determine the law and the fact in a general verdict, it gave
them the right also.

By withholding power from the court to

alter a verdict of not guilty in criminal cases, the law
assumed the jury's right to exercise this power independently of the judge; if a jury convicted against the opinion
45 10 Metcalf 14, Commonwealth v. White.
46
The conviction of a jury for giving a false verdict,
now an obsolete procedure.
47

10 Metcalf, 169.
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of the court, the remedy lay with the court to set the verdict aside.

Surely, he said, the jury resolved both law and

fact when they deliberated on a general verdict, for why

distinguish it from a special verdict if they did not?
Indeed, if a jury could not determine the law according to
their judgment and conviction, their verdict was forced upon
them, their oaths were meaningless, and the citizen was
deprived of his right to be judged by his peers.

To suggest

that the jury would not comprehend the law was to "disparage
their office as well as to impugn the law, which does not
assume incapacity where it imposes duties to be performed. 1148
He saw the jury as a safer deposit of popular rights in a
free government than a court, which was not responsible for
its judgments, though they be wrong or corrupt.

Until the

excitement caused by the liquor license cases, both the common law and precedent had sustained the right of juries to
decide the law, and such had been the instruction in
Commonwealth v. Knapp and Commonwealth v. Kneeland.

Nor had

the practice of counsel to argue the law to the jury for
their deliberation ever before been denied or questioned in
the judicial history of the state.
Justice Shaw, setting aside the verdict, left with
counsel the right to address the jury on questions of law,
citing the "latitude which has been allowed in this
Commonwealth, by a long course of practice." 49 He accepted
that observations by counsel must contain an exposition of
48

10 Metcalf 274.

49

Ibid., 285.
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.,,,,,-

the law, to the possible edification of all, but he saw as
"separate and distinct," 50 the question of whether the jury
might then decide authoritatively upon the law. Vigorously
. ht , 51 h e s t a t e d th a t , since
.
th e a d op t'ion o f
.
t h'is rig
d enying
jury trial as a settled mode of proceeding in courts of justice, it had been recognized that it was the province and
duty of judges to decide the law, and of juries to consider
and weigh facts.

Upon this was founded the whole doctrine

of bills of exception, which gave to all persons the full
benefit of revision by the court of last resort on all questions of law.

According to the Constitution of the

Commonwealth, every citizen was entitled to the authoritative declaration and application of the laws, fixed and permanent, impartial and equal in operation.

Hinting that a

jury, having a rightful authority to decide questions of law,
might legitimize local prejudices, he asked how the security
of citizens could be protected without a steady and uniform
interpretation of the laws.

And it was the "more necessary

to adhere to this rule," he said, because it was "within the
province • • • of the judicial department, on proper occasions, to decide whether an act • • • is within the just
limits of legislative power, and whether it is constitutional and valid." 52
50 10 Metcalf 275.
51 In 1855, Dewey would suggest that these two rulings

were "not in entire harmony."
5 Gray 238.)
52 10 Metcalf 281.

(Commonwea·lth v. Anthes
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Commonwealth v. Abbott, in 1847, decided the question
of whether the jury was bound to follow the court's opinion
on constitutionality.

Shaw sustained the trial court's rul-

ing that a juror could not be disqualified because he had
formed and expressed an opinion on the constitutional validity of the liquor license laws, but he denied the juror's
right to determine constitutionality, insisting that it was
his duty to be governed by the instructions of the court,
even though his opinion might differ.

In this way he frus-

trated counsel's design to obtain an acquittal on a statute
nullified by a jury. 53
The political response stimulated by these cases
resulted in an amendment in the state constitutional convention of 1853, giving juries the right to interpret the law.
When this amendment, together with the new constitution, was
rejected by the voters, the legislature passed a statute in
1855 which provided that "in all trials for criminal
offences, it shall be the duty of the jury • • • to decide
at their discretion •
.
,,54
th e issue.

both the fact and law involved in

Shaw reinterpreted this statute in Commonwealth v.
Anthes (1855).

Asserting that it was a "declaratory act,

making no substantial change in the law regulating the
53 13 Metcalf 120.
54
Commonwealth v. Anthes, 5 Gray 185.
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relative rights and functions of the court and the jury," 55
he held that the trial judge had erred in permitting the
jury to determine the meaning of the liquor license law.

Several cases in the state bearing upon this statute justified a fresh analysis of procedure in criminal prosecutions,
and Shaw proceeded to give a lengthy and definitive opinion
on the respective provinces of judge and jury.
The Constitution and the common law entrust to the
judge, he said, the determination of the law on which an
indictment is founded.

This required proficiency and skill

in jurisprudence, and an accurate and complete knowledge of
constitutional law.

Adjudication of facts, which demanded a

practical knowledge of affairs, discernment of motives,
integrity and impartiality, was invested in the jury, with
the power to embrace and declare the law, as received from
the court, and the fact, in finding a general verdict.

Cer-

tainty and uniformity in the administration and exercise of
judicial power, which preserved the defendant's right to
due process, presupposed that the jury received the law from
the court, and acted in conformity with it.

Where, in ear-

lier times, the doctrine of attaint was the only way to
reverse a judgment, exceptions could now be made to the ruling of a judge.

If a statute allowed the jury to interpret

the law, no exceptions would lie, for the law incorporated
55 Ibid., 187.
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in the verdict would be unknowable. 56

The exercise of judi-

cial review by a jury, or the variable and inconclusive
application of the law, would subvert the Constitution of

the Commonwealth, which provided for a state court of last
resort, under independent and unbiased judges, with power of
review, and the authority to guide by precedents to assure
uniformity in all courts.
Taking a narrow view of the statute, he stated that,
if a jury were to try criminal cases "according to established forms and principles of law, 1157 they would be proceeding upon the familiar ground of the common law, in receiving
the law from the court.

He agreed that ambiguity in the
words "try" and "decide by a general verdict 1158 might lead
to the supposition that a jury could determine the law, and
assess the constitutional validity of a statute, against the
directions of the court. However, even the "broadest and
most liberal view 1159 of the Constitution, would find the
statute unconstitutional, for the Legislature could not vest
in other persons, whose duties were limited and temporary,
the power of the judicial department to decide the law.
In separate opinions, Justices George T. Bigelow,
Charles Dewey and Benjamin F. Thomas, all Whigs, the latter
56

But see "The Changing Role of the Jury," 174, 181
n. 66: The problem of the jury's determination of the law
could have been met by interrogating the jury, or by utilizing a reviewing court. These suggestions were made in 1847
and 1809.
57 5 Gray 220.
59 Ibid., 222.
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two dissenting, insisted that it was the legislature's
intent to change the rule of the common law as declared in
Porter because of adverse criticism of the opinion in the
community.

Bigelow believed that a "true construction" of

the statute must acknowledge the intent of the legislature
to change the rule in Porter, but believed that it was not
within the constitutional authority of the legislature to
. h t on Juries.
.
.
60
con f er sue h a rig

Neither Dewey nor Thomas

regarded the statute as giving more than a carefully guarded
and qualified power and right to the jury to depart from the
instructions of the court in favour of the accused.

Any

intelligent and watchful judge would, they believed, know
whether the jury had conformed to the court's opinion, and
the party would be protected by bills of exception.
they had reservations about the statute.

But

Though asserting

that judges should have no opinion concerning its wisdom and
expediency, Thomas ventured:
Whether the statute is in harmony with public policy,
whether it renders less certain the conviction of
offenders against the law, whether it gives to jurors a
power for the exercise of which their previous training
has not fitted them, are questions for the lawrnaker.61
However, neither would deny the statute's constitutionality.

Reviewing the changes in the system of jury

trial, they recognized the contributions of legislation.

Had

not the legislature, said Thomas, used its power to ensure
that juries were impartial and independent, and persons of
character and intelligence?
60 5 Gray, 251.

Indeed, had not the legislature

61 5 Gray, 283.
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declared the right of the jury to decide, at their discretion, both the law and the fact, in a law of 1807, in force
until 1836, never tested by the courts, and only left out in
the revised statutes, he believed, because it was a familiar
rule requiring no affirmative legislation?

Did not

Commonwealth v. Kneeland concur with the statute; had not
Justices Wilde and Morton accepted that cases arise where
the jury might assess the constitutionality of a legislative
act?

Yet Porter had rejected practice and usage, treating
62
the matter as "one of abstract reason and speculation."

The Supreme Court, he said, "on the verge of political discussion • • • was on extremely dangerous ground." 63
The meaningful role which laymen had played in court
proceedings was considerably restrained by the middle of the
nineteenth century.

As these cases demonstrate, the judi-

cial arbitrators of orderly social process, no matter whether Democrat or Whig, determined that the people as jurors
should no longer, as previously agreed upon, interpret questions of law, had contracted the role of the jury to the
resolution of questions of fact.

Having established control

in civil cases, where, as Tocqueville had seen, a judge/jury
partnership functioned as a major check on majoritarian
despotism, the courts had extended their domination into
criminal cases, molding a protective framework to preserve
minorities from the people at large.

Echoing Tocqueville's

anxiety that juries might succumb to the subtle pressures
62 s Gray, 283.

63 Ibid., 260.

34

and intimidations of majorities, which, generating a "germ
of tyranny," contributed to the unpredictability and uncertainty of the legal system, the courts fixed boundaries upon

the people's power as jurors to sanction the wrathful will
of the majority.

CHAPTER III
The Judiciary and the Political Authorities
In describing the operation of judicial review,
Tocqueville wrote that a law, once censured in the courts,
was not abolished, though it lost "a portion of its moral
force"; it required "reiterated attacks of judicial functionaries" to accomplish its final destruction.

He believed

that legislation was protected from "wanton" assaults by the
judiciary, for, when a judge contested a law "in an obscure
debate on some particular case," the importance of his
attack was generally concealed from the public's attention.
Further, such assault necessarily required that the private
interests of an individual must be linked with the dubious
law in the course of litigation; judicial censorship over
legislation therefore could never extend to all laws indiscriminately. 1
Yet, Tocqueville would later write that, "armed with
the power of declaring the laws unconstitutional, the
American magistrate perpetually interferes in political
affairs" through the courts of justice, "by which the legal
profession is enabled to control the democracy." 2 This
1

Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 101-3.

2Ibid., I, 178-9.
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contradiction meriting close consideration, the question is,
did legislative, or judicial, standards of constitutional
propriety prevail?

In The Federalist No. 78, Hamilton had claimed that
the,judiciary was designed as an "intermediate body" between
the legislature, whose authority, as servant of the people,
was limited by the Constitution, and the people, in whom
sovereignty lay.

Where the decisions of the legislature,

proclaimed in its statutes, violated the will of the people,
as declared in the Constitution, it became the duty of the
courts to declare such actions void, for the interpretation
of the law was the peculiar province of jurists.

This sup-

posed no superiority of the judicial over the legislative
power, for both were agents of the people.

Instead, it

advanced a "more rational interpretation" of the
Constitution, which had no clear provisions regarding the
resolution of constitutional conflicts. 3
An

alternative to Hamilton's view that the judiciary

was the ultimate arbiter of constitutionality, echoed in
Tocqueville's declaration that the courts, far from imposing
their construction of the Constitution on others, merely
applied their evaluation to cases before them, was claimed
by Jackson in his bank veto of July, 1832. 4

His conception

of presidential authority, with its contention that the
3clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Paper~, 467.
4
Richardson, Messa·ges a·nd Papers of the Presidents,
II, p. 582.
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executive was not obliged to recognize the validity of judicial decisions, proceeded from his right to exercise a separate judgment upon the widom and constitutionality of a pro-

posed law, and could not be seriously challenged.

However,

linked as it was with the bank recharter issue, it raised
storms of controversy.
Early nineteenth century courts had tended to leave to
the electoral and legislative processes the resolution of
conflicts between organized social interest groups, and few
had reviewed constitutional matters of more than individual
or local interest.

Their perceived purpose, which Hamilton

had articulated, was to protect the people, a cohesive body
possessing shared beliefs about the nature of republican
government, from legislatures which betrayed their trust and
violated the Constitution. 5
With the advent of Jacksonian democracy, an enlarged
electorate presupposing a more responsible selection, the
prospect of legislative betrayal in an increasingly democratic society seemed more remote.

Further, judges acknow-

ledged that constitutional provisions were often inexact.
This necessary condition of a flexible system of government
that could adjust to the changing needs of society meant,
however, that the exercise of judicial discretion in the
invalidation of legislative acts, which involved a value
5
william E. Nelson, "Changing Conceptions of Judicial
Review," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 120 (1972),
1177.
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judgment as political as it was legal, could be perceived as
anti-democratic.

Yet, courts could no longer ignore the

re-evaluation of legislative political determinations upon

divisive social conflicts between organized groups, as these
cases came increasingly before them.
In this new context, where courts were more aware of
the public interest in, and significance of, their decisions,
respect for the legislature, according to Leonard Levy, was
a "maxim" of the Shaw court in Massachusetts. 6 Only two
cases of judicial intervention within the province of the
political authorities occurred in the ten-year period,
1835-45, and these both concerned local government.
In the first case, City of Boston v. Shaw (1840),
Justice Putnam found invalid a by-law of the City of Boston.
The ordinance had required that every landowner who used a
city sewer should be assessed for its construction, according to the immediate prior evaluation made of his property.
Though the power was given by charter to the city to lay and
assess taxes and make by-laws, and it was reasonable for the
city to construct common sewers, when he considered the mode
of assessment he believed it to be unequal and unreasonable,
and therefore unjust.

For the apportionment to be fair, he

suggested, it ought to be made on the value of the land
6Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice
Shaw, 267.
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independently of the buildings, and should be settled at the
time of construction. 7
In Worcester v. Western Railroad Corporation (1842),

Chief Justice Shaw, using the eminent domain power as an
instrument to encourage economic growth, extended a tax
immunity for a so-called public work.

The city had claimed

that, although the railroad's right of way was exempt from
taxes, its buildings, lying in whole or in part within the
limits of the right of way, were not.

After examining the

railroad's charter, Shaw ruled that the corporation, established "for the public use and benefit," held its personal
property "in trust for the public

• for a well-defined

public object," and that, because the legislature had
reserved to itself certain powers and controls, it was not a
private corporation in the contemplation of the law, and, as
such, like bridges and turnpikes, was exempt from taxes. 8
No limit to this exemption was written into the charter,
therefore all buildings "used to promote the purposes contemplated by the act," and all lands purchased by the corporation were immune "as appropriated to public use," unless
they were reasonably incident to the support of the railroad,
or to its use as a common carrier. 9
Perhaps at issue, also, was concern that localism
could result in inconsistent bases of evaluation and/or competition for revenue among taxing towns, which could
7 1 Metcalf, 130.
9 Ibid., 568.

8

4 Metcalf, 566.
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seriously impede the development of facilities critical to
the general economy.

These two cases reveal that the

Massachusetts court had decided to foster economic changes

on their terms; that, within the boundaries of constitutional safeguards, the law would protect and aid individuals
10
. th eir
. priva
. t e p 1 anning.
.
in

What appears significant in

the later case is the community consensus, a belief shared
by both legislature and judiciary, that legal doctrines
should delegate power and resources to private entrepreneurs
to promote economic growth, a view of public policy that was
highly pragmatic.
The predominant characteristic of judicial review in
Pennsylvania in this period, on the other hand, is a marked
antagonism towards the legislature, which had asserted its
dominance by interfering with judicial tenure.
was particularly sensitive.

The subject

Just before the new

Constitution of 1838 went into effect, the Chief Justice was
persuaded by his friends to resign, and was re-appointed by
the outgoing governor, securing the longest term that the
new law allowed. 11
Leib v. Commonwealth (May, 1840) concerned an associate judge of the Court of Common Pleas who had duplicated
10

James W. Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in
Nineteenth Century United States (Madison, 1956), 52, 25:
"A kind of insistence on equal protection of the law, that a
particular individual should not be made to bear out of his
own resources the cost of conununity benefit."
11

254.

Howard Knott, Dictionary o·f American· Biography, IV,
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this procedure.

At issue was the attempt by the legislature

to initiate popular control of the bench by substituting a
limited commission for life tenure.

The lower court had

determined that, according to the amended constitution of
the state, Leib had no authority to exercise the office of
associate judge after January 1, 1839.

The decision of the

court was delivered by Justice Sergeant, a Democrat who
would strongly oppose the amendment to elect judges and
resign in 1843. 12 He denied that the court below had jurisdiction under an act of June, 1836, whereby power was given
to the courts of common pleas to hear personal suits "within
their respective counties." 13 Holding that an associate
judge of the Court of Common Pleas was not a county officer
within the meaning of the act, which embraced instead "officers inferior in grade and consequence," but was, as
described in the amended constitution of 1838, an "associate
judge of the state," he regretted the finding that Leib no
longer held his commission in January 1, 1839. 14 The amendment concerning associate justices, differing from that
12 Julian P. Boyd, Ibid., VIII, ii, 590.
13
9 Watts, 220 (1840). This court was Leib's own.
His appointment by the out-going governor on December 29,
1838, followed upon a vacancy created- when Daniel Yost
resigned, after holding the commission for 30 years. Judge
Porter, the president of the court, observed that, "although
it is not contended that the respondent had anything to do
with procuring his resignation, yet still, for that resignation there would have been no vacancy to fill." (Ibid.,
215)'.
-149 Watts, 215.
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affecting president judges, 15 made no express qualifications
regarding the time at which commissions had been issued.
Nor had the legislature the power to arrange by statute, and

then re-arrange by another, the classification of associate
justices as to tenure, for this was "inconsistent with the
constitution, and fraught with inconvenience and hazard to
the community." 16 Therefore, he considered as valid the act
of June, 1839, which had systematized the tenure of associate justices according to the priority of the dates of their
commissions as they stood on January, 1839, and under which
Leib was designated to remain in office until February,
1843. 17 The supplementary act of March, 1840, which graded
commissions according to the date of the adoption of the
constitution, which the legislature chose to recognize as
October 9, 1838, and which terminated Leib's term in
February, 1840, now past, Sergeant considered to be unconstitutional.

Further, the earlier statute was passed during

the legislature's first session according to a provision
15
The precedent for the finding in the lower court was
Commonwealth v. Collins, 8 Watts 331, (1839), where Justice
Kennedy had held that the new constitution had been adopted
when the speaker of the senate publicly announced its ratification, which had occurred on December 11, 1838. (Justice
Huston, in a strong dissent, had determined the date of
adoption to be January 1, 1839.) President judges appointed
between the adoption of the constitution and January 1, 1839,
therefore lost their commissions on the latter date.
16 watts, 227.
17 rbid., thereby ranking Leib according to the seniority of the commission as held by his predecessor, Yost.
Actually, Leib took the oath of office on December 31, 1838.
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required by the new constitution, which a subsequent legislature could not constitutionally do.

18

In Norman v. Heist (1843), Chief Justice Gibson construed an act so as to set limits to legislative omnipotence,
but stopped short of voiding it.

In this case, by an act

passed in 1841, the children of an illegitimate son were
declared to be "able and capable" of inheriting their grandmother's property. 19

As she had died in 1840 without making

a will, her estate had passed to her brothers by the intestate laws, though her grandchildren had continued to reside
there.

Stating that the latter had misconstrued the effect

of the statute, which was merely enabling, and that the property might yet descend to them in default of issue of the
brothers, Gibson denounced the act as "an

~

post facto

rescript or decree made for the occasion."
Retracting his former statements regarding judicial
review, 20 the Chief Justice declared that, as the estate was
18 9 Watts, 226-7, for it is "a delegation to that specific body of a portion of the sovereign power of the people."
19

5 Watts and Sergeant, 173 (1843).

20 As a judge in Pennsylvania in 1825, Gibson had contested the exercise of judicial review upon legislative acts,
which he perceived as expressions of the sovereign power of
the people, according to the "postulate, in the theory of
our government, and the very basis of the superstructure,
that the people are wise, virtuous and competent to manage
their own affairs" - Eakin v. Raub, 12 Sargent and Rawle,
330 (1825), (emphasis in text) quoted in Nelson, "Changing
Conceptions of Judicial Review," 1181. Gibson had questioned whether judicial interpretation of legislation with
reference to constitutional texts involved merely legal
determinations, for repugnance to the constitution was not
always "self-evident"; the exercise of "political" discretion must be admitted.
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lawfully vested in the plaintiffs as heirs of their intestate sister, by no "act of despotic power" could the legislature deprive them of their property, with or without com-

pensation:
Not only because the general provision in the bill of
rights was deemed sufficiently explicit for that, but
because it was expected that no Legislature would be so
regardless of right as to attempt it. Were this reasonable expectation to be disappointed, it would become our
plain and imperative duty to obey the immediate and paramount will of the people expressed • • • in the adoption of the constitution, rather than the repugnant
will of their delegates acting under a restricted, but
transcended authority.
The right of property, he said, had no foundation or security but the law, and "when the Legislature shall successfully attempt to overturn it, even in a single instance, the
liberty of the citizen shall be no more. 1121
Though no statute was invalidated in Clippinger v.
Hepbaugh (1843), the case offered another opportunity for
judicial observations upon legislative ethics.

In revers-

ing a verdict whereby an attorney, in the court below, had
successfully sued for services rendered in procuring a private act on a contingency basis, Justice Rogers held that,
should the court give "legal sanction" to contracts for such
services, it would be "impossible to foretell the train of
evils of which it may be the prolific parent."

Already the

legislature had been "contaminated by sinister and improper
influences.

..•

There is at least a wide-spread and grow-

ing suspicion of legislative integrity, which of itself is
21

watts and Sergeant, 173.

45

an evil of no little magnitude."

He believed that contracts

for contingent fees should be illegal, to avoid improper
tampering with the people's representatives, for "many pain22
ful examples" had already appeared.
In Commonwealth v. Mann {1843) the court set aside two
legislative acts which had reduced the salary of a president
judge of the court of common pleas subsequent to his appointment.

Finding that, under Article 5, Section 2, of the

Constitution, compensation for justices should not be diminished during their tenure, Justice Rogers rejected the claim
made by the state's treasurer that the legislature had the
power to withdraw a gratuitous increase in salary, and, to
create additional revenue, to extinguish the state's debts
by withholding taxes assessed upon salaries of officers of
the Commonwealth.

The case, he said, raised matters of "the

most grave and important character, involving the construction of the fundamental principles of government. 1123

His

sincere respect for a coordinate branch made him reluctant
to question a legislative exposition of the Constitution,
but history had taught him to guard the rights of the citizen from the "injustices and gradual encroaclunents of those
to whom they were compelled to intrust the management of
their affairs"; experience had taught him that there was no
better way of destroying the liberties of the people than by
the government's utilization of a "venal, time-serving,
22
5 Watts and Sergeant, 319.

23 5 watts and Sergeant, 405.
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.
. d. .
24
timid and subservient
JU iciary.
11

Using "copious"

extracts, for which he knew he would be excused, by able
commentators of the constitution on the second section of
the fifth article, he had surely proved that "a power over a
man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will," and
therefore:
To effect a favorite object of legislative ambition, or
to gratify the vindictive feelings occasioned by the
phrenzy and madness of party, a successful resort may be
had, by ~gch means, to the judicial tribunals of the
country.
Warming to his subject, he declared that, where the
departments in a government were separate, the:
Judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always
be the least dangerous to the political rights of the
Constitution, because it will be least in a capacity to
annoy and injure them. • • • It may be truly sai~ to
have neither force nor will but merely judgment. 6
It had no influence over sword nor purse, and:
No direction of either the strength or the wealth of
society, and can take no active resolution whatever •
and though individual oppression may now and then proceed from courts of justice, the general liberty of the
people can never be endangered from that quarter • • •
so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from
both the legislature and the executive.
If, because of its "natural feebleness," the judiciary were
in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, "permanent
tenure of judicial off ices, and an invariable compensation,
incapable of diminution," would enable it to be considered
as a "bulwark 0 of a limited constitution. 27 This court,
24
26
27

Ibid., 406 (1843).

25 Ibid., 406-8.

Ibid., 408-9, emphasis in original.
Watts and Sergeant, 410-11 (1843).
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then would not betray its trust by refusing "to interpose to
prevent injustice, whether arising from a wilful, deliberate
and wicked invasion of the Constitution," or from a mistaken
construction of the legislative authority.

The court would

meet on the threshold the first attempt at encroachment by
voiding these two acts.
Although the justice had things to say about infamous
despotism, "the limits of a judicial opinion" would not
allow him to pursue this theme. 28
Putting aside old scruples about judicial review, for
which, instead, justifications were diligently delivered,
the court had censured legislative interference with judicial function, contested legislative omnipotence, and warned
against legislative impiety.

The citizen would be sheltered

from political majoritarianism.
By 1835, the Supreme Court in Tennessee was no longer
prepared to tolerate what it considered to be an extravagant
accretion of power by the legislature:

"We are aware of

what is every day urged, the omnipotence of the legislature;
that whatever is not forbidden by the Constitution is left
open for that body to do," Justice Peck said in that year.
He denounced legislative actions which "step[ped] in the
place of judicial authority. 1129

The cases in the decade

following reveal the development of constitutional doctrines
28 Ibid., 421.
29
Richardson v. Wilson, 8 Yerger 79-80 (1835). The case
involved a plea for alimony following a legislative divorce.
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as principles for the evaluation of legislation, so as to
curb legislative authority.
Utilizing the doctrine of natural rights, Justice
Green, in Jones' Heirs v. Perry (1836), voided a private act
which had authorized a guardian of infants to sell land
against a parent's indebtedness.

The defendant's counsel
had claimed that, by the "law of the land," 30 real estate
was subject to payment of liabilities which descended to
heirs.

Just as title could be divested to settle obliga-

tions by order of the constitution, so might the legislature
pass a private act authorizing a remedy for a debt.

He

believed that the heirs, though minors, were of age to understand and consent to the sale, and that the act of limitations protected the defendant, who had been in possession
under the deed of sale for more than seven years.
The justice held that the private act of 1825 was an
exercise of judicial authority which deprived the complainants of their property without the judgment of their peers
or the operation of the law of the land.

By the sixth arti-

cle of the constitution, which vested judicial power in the
courts, the legislature was restrained from encroaching upon
the jurisdiction of a coordinate department.

"In substance,•

the act of 1825 was a judicial decree which adjudged the
existence of a debt, and determined its discharge by means
of a law neither uniform, universal nor permanent in
30 10 Yerger, 67.
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character. 31

The language of the bill of rights forbade the

enactment of any law by which an individual's rights were
abridged.

Only by the "judgment of his peers or the law of

the land" could he be deprived of his life, liberty or property; the term "law of the land" implied a "general and
public law, operating equally upon every member of the community. "32
It was "settled law" in Tennessee, Green declared,
that creditors of an ancestor had no lien upon the lands
descended to an heir. 33 Though tedious, the course of law
was available for those to whom debts were owing.

Neither

was an inf ant capable of exercising discreet judgment concerning his possessions; he could not be an agent in their
sale.

Though the defendants had failed to register the deed

of sale until 1829, their possession there-under from 1826
barred only the eldest complainant, who was of age within
the seven-year limit established by statute, from recovery,
and the title must revert to the others.
It was the intention of the court, said Green, to
"check the assumption of an excess power" by the legislature
promptly, whenever a case occurred, and so "accustom" the
members to the restraints of the constitution; therefore,
while on the one hand, the courts:
Ought to entertain for the legislature the highest
respect, and to decide against their acts only from the
31Ibid., 70.

34

Ibid., 71.

32 10 Yerger, 71.
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clearest convictions of duty, on the other hand, where
they are clearly satisfied the constitution is violated,
they have no alternative but to declare that such act of
assembly is not law.34
In Buddv. State (1842), the court again annulled a
statute deemed partial, this time in the divisive area of
bank charters.

In the court below, Budd, employed as "clerk
of the individual ledger, 1135 was found guilty of making a
false entry with a view to defraud the Union Bank, incorporated by statute in 1832.

Justice Reese, referring to the

22nd section of the act, by which it was made a criminal
offence for "officers, agents and servants" to attempt to
cheat the bank, held that, as "clerks" were not specifically
designated, they were not "properly comprehended and
described"; that the term clerk was "of such varied import,
that we are not at liberty to hold that 'clerk,' and especially 'clerk of the individual ledger,' is equivalent to
officer, agent or servant. 1136 Neither had the indictment
specifically indicated that Budd was employed by the bank,
and therefore he was not properly charged.
Despite having overturned the judgment, Reese proceeded to find a:
Graver and weightier question • • • whether the act of
1832, which created a felony in relation to officers,
servants and agents of the Union Bank only, could be
considered as "the law of the land" consistent with the
bill of rig~ts.37
Citing Jones' Heirs, he held that the protection intended to
3·4 rbid., 71.
36 3 Humphreys, 489.

35

3 Humphreys, 488.

37 Ibid., 490.
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be extended to individuals by the bill of rights could not
be effective where their liberty or property might be
exposed to the operation of a partial law.

He believed that

the bank could find other effective safeguards which were
consistent with public liberty.

"As to the coordinate

department," he added:
To whose enactment we feel unable to give effect, we
cheerfully acknowledge that their intelligence, and numbers, and high motives and sanctions under which they,
too act, impose upon us the obligation, when comparing
the result of any deliberation of theirs with the paramount law which governs us all, to be well satisfied
that in declaring a statute invalid and void we but obey
the mandate of the constitution.38
In 1844, John H. White, special judge, in Governor v.
Porter and Sureties, invoked constitutional restrictions
.
39
upon a statute which undertook to construe an earlier act.
Holding that, "as the Constitution is the paramount law,"
whereby each department of government was prohibited from
"exercising any of the powers properly belonging to any of
the others," he declared that the legislature could not
destroy the checks and balances of government by enacting a
law which, neither repealing nor replacing an earlier statute, "decide[d] upon its construction." 40
According to the conditions of the first act, of 1835,
Porter (a sheriff) had posted a bond in the county court for
the collection and payment of state taxes for the years 1840
and 1841.

A

subsequent act, of 1839-40, required that bonds

3·8 rbid., 493.
40

39

5 Humphreys, 168.

s

Humphreys, 167.
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were to be executed as per the act of 1835, "which shall be
construed to require said bonds to be given hereafter every
year. 1141 Porter was indicted in the court below for default
and delinquency for the year 1841, and his demurrer to the
plea was sustained.
Asserting that deficiencies in the drafting of both
statutes endangered the security of the public revenue by
permitting it to be plundered by a public officer, Judge
White declined to construe them liberally so as to render
them effectual.

He therefore voided the later act, declared

the 1835 act as effective in its terms, reversed the lower

cour~'s ruling and overruled the demurrer. 42
In Green v. Allen (1844), the court again stepped in
to overturn special legislation considered arbitrary in a
suit which, on appeal from the chancery court, presented for
the first time in Tennessee the matter of donations to charity.
The case concerned a will which, by its terms,
required the executor to sell all property, and to give a
quarter of the proceeds to the Tennessee Annual Conference
of the Methodist Episcopal Church (an unincorporated society)

for the benefit of its schools and missions, and "to be
otherwise disposed of" as the society thought fit. 43
41
42

In an

Ibid., 168.

rbid., 168-9. Thereby depriving the crafty sheriff
of the loophole perceived in the 1839-40 statute.
43
5 Humphreys, 170.
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elaborate and lengthy opinion, in which he investigated the
44
medieval and colonial backgrounds of bequests,
to show
that donations for charitable and pious purposes had long
been subject to abuse, Justice Turley held that a Tennessee
court of chancery had no jurisdiction over a trust "when it
it must be of such
45
a tangible nature that the court can deal with it."
There
is mixed up with general moral duty •

was no power in such a court similar to that of the Lord
Chancellor in England who, as an agent of the crown, exercised personal jurisdiction over the use and administration
of bequests considered general and indefinite; this would be
inconsistent with the constitution of the state as being a
"branch of executive prerogative." 46 Further, as a charity
"must stand or fall as it was found to exist at the death of
the testator, if it were not then legal and valid, no subsequent statute of the legislature can make it good." 47 The
appointment, under a special act of 1841, of trustees to
receive the bequest on behalf of the Methodist Episcopal
Society membership, was not only too late, but was an exercise of judicial function.

Indeed, the act was unconstitu-

tional and void under Article 7, Section 11, which prohibited the passage of partial laws for the benefit of
44

Ibid., 179, 189: an "investigation alarming in its
extent an<rperplexity" for searching for some principles of
chancery jurisdiction was "like looking for a live body in
an Egyptian catacomb."
45
46 Ibi"d., 206.
5 Hump h reys, 194 •
47
Ibid., 209.

54

particular individuals.

He could not, therefore, sustain

the validity of the bequest, which was declared unenforceable. 48
While articulating justifications for judicial review,
the Tennessee court had used constitutional precepts and
procedural formulae to defeat special legislation where, it
stated, arbitrary legislative power had led to abuses, confusion and uncertainty.

The New York court, in this period,

expanded the overview of legislation, applying traditional
doctrines and forms to challenge statutes deemed tainted
with tyranny, and developing rules of interpretation to maximize their discretion and authority.

The first three cases

deal with the eminent domain power, which had been utilized
aggressively by the legislature for public improvement.
The first comprehended the principle of compensation
and the concerns of state economic planners for low costs in
the development of water transportation.

In People v. Canal

Appraisers (1835), the owner of a millsite impaired by the
construction of the Erie Canal, having proved his title by
jury verdict in the court below, sued for compensation for
injuries resulting from the diversion of water into a sloop
lock.

The defendants' counsel claimed that, by an act

passed in 1792, the state, exercising its sovereign power,
had granted to the canal company as a "free gift" the stream
upon which the millsite stooa. 49
4·8 Ibid., 210.

As the common law

49 13 Wendell, 363.
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principle with regard to navigable rivers did not apply in
the state, owners of adjoining banks could not be regarded
as holding title to the streams.

Justice Jacob Sutherland,

declining to discuss whether the English common law test
were applicable "to the nature and extent of our inland
streams," 50 held that, though the legislature "appear to
have overlooked or disregarded" the principle of the common
law in granting islands to other individuals, as separate
and distinct from the land on their respective banks, it was
his contention that the relater was the owner to the middle
of the stream. 51 Therefore, "when private property is
destroyed, and its beneficial enjoyment is essentially
impaired in the prosecution of public works, the owner is
entitled to compensation."

Damages must be appraised for
the southern half of the stream. 52
In 1839, the court again enunciated firm principles
for the evaluation of legislation involving the eminent

domain power.

In The Matter of John and Cherry Streets, an

1818 statute had established the procedure whereby the City
of New York might improve any street or public place, the
court reviewing the estimates and assessments made by
SOibid., 371. If the rivers were subject to the ebb
and flow-or-the tide, they were regarded as non-navigable
under the test of the English common law. There were, in
contrast to the English isle, navigable fresh water rivers
in America, in which the tide did not ebb and flow. In 1836,
keeping a finger on the pulse of change, the court rejected
the common law rule: ca·nal Appraisers v. The People, 17
Wendell, 571.
51
52 Ibid., 373.
Ibid., 372.
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court-appointed commissioners for the Corporation and any
objection thereto.

Justice Cowen, observing that it was

difficult for a judge to dismiss as unfair estimates by
experts in the field, where present and future valuations
had to be considered, stated that he would not reject a
report where the proceedings were regular, and where "no
error in principle" were evident. 53 He had found no adequate ground for the reconsideration of damage awards to the
individual objectors in the case, but questioned whether the
Corporation might legally take as its own, and for a nominal
price, a triangular piece of property belonging to unknown
owners, in the closing and straightening of John Street, and
narrow strips of land, also of owners unknown, from which
the proposed new Cherry Street receded.

Was not this:

Incompatible with that part of the state constitution
which declared that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law • • •
unless it were a taking of property for public use, or,
in other words~ an exercise of the national right of
eminent doman?~4
The common law recognized title of owners adjacent to public
highways to the centre of the road, subject only to the public right of way.

Therefore, where a street were discontin-

ued in part or in whole, the rules applied.

Consequently,

as a statute was void which authorized the transfer of property without the consent of the owners, he referred the
report back to the commissioners for reconsideration and
53
54

19 Wendell, 670.

Ibid., 666.

S7
correction by assigning the property awarded to the
Corporation to the adjacent property owners.SS
In 1843, in the face of a sharp dissent by Chief
Justice Samuel Nelson, the court rejected the orthodox view
of public purpose in the

invasion of property through the

power of eminent domain.

In Taylor v. Porter and Ford,

Justice Bronson struck down as unconstitutional a colonial
statute passed in 1772, which, according to Nelson, had been
in active opera t 'ion ever since, s6 b y wh'ich 1 and owners were

If'

I

I

..

able to build private roads through others' property, with
damages assessed.

Utilizing the doctrine of natural rights,

whereby the people, who alone had absolute sovereignty,
could not be deprived of their property except by "the law
of the land" (which, according to Coke and Kent, meant "due
process of law 11 S7 ), he limited the exercise of legislative
authority to "such powers as have been delegated to it. • • •
Neither liberty nor property, except when forfeited by crime,
or when the latter is taken for public use, falls within the
scope of the power."S 8
Though it was a "grave matter" to declare an act of
the legislature unconstitutional,sg the judiciary would
55
Ibid., 677. Besides, he said, although the
Corporation had "always sold [property taken] to the adjacent owners at the nominal prices which they gave," under
the principle of eminent domain, any municipal court could
become "legal purchasers on summary appraisal, and then sell
out to individuals," perhaps third parties.
S6 4 Hill, 1S2.
S7 Ibid., 146.
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Ibid., 145.

59 Ibid., 143.
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decide whether public purpose adheredtothe taking of private property.

He feared that there was otherwise no consti-

tutional barrier to uncompensated takings:

"If the power

exists to take the property of one man without his consent
and transfer it to another, it may be exercised without any
.
.
..60
reference to the question
o f compensation.

As Justice Nelson's dissent suggests, the court had
rejected the hitherto utilitarian justification for the use
of the eminent domain power:
Works of this nature are indispensible to the prosperity of the country • • • • So intimately are they interwoven with individual enterprise and the public welfare
that their establishment and regulation have hitherto
been regarded as an essential branch of internal
police. 6 1
By creating a distinction between public and private
appropriations under this power, the court gave notice that
legislatively authorized acquisitions would no longer be
upheld simply because they furthered the state's economic
improvement.

By means of "the law of the land" and "natural

rights," the court had reversed its earlier trend of support
for legislative encouragement of economic growth through the
use of the doctrine of eminent domain.

What is significant

about this case is the development of a substantive as well
as a procedural concept of due process:

"The legislative

power of this state does not reach to such an unwarrantable
GO Ibid., 148.
6·1 Ibid., 150.
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extent." 62

How striking a vindication of judicial review of

"public use," as against the legislative view.
In People v. Kane, the court, in 1840, moving to other
matters, rejected an attempt by the City of Albany to assert
local political autonomy by exercising its power over that
of the governor of the state.

Chief Justice Nelson, a con-

servative Democrat who had participated in the New York
Constitutional Convention of 1821, 63 held that a legislative act of 1826, which gave to the Common Council of Albany
the power to appoint police justices, was "clearly in conf lict with the 7th section of the 4th Article of the
Constitution," as adopted by the people in 1822, which provided that all judicial officers were to be appointed by the
governor and senate.

As the functions of police justices

were "wholly of a judicial character," they were to be
appointed as the Constitution directed, 64 and Kane, named by
the Council of the City to the position in 1838, had
"intruded into the office. 1165
This challenge to a relatively old statute, which had
stood for 14 years, suggests that the court was adopting a
new, more rigorous attitude towards the overview of legislation.

In 1841, the court, per the Chief Justice, held that

an act of the legislature of 1814 would have been null and
62 4 Hill, 145.
63
Robert E. Cushman, Dict:k>nary of American Biography,
VII, 411.
64
65 Ibid., 414.
23 Wendell, 417.
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void as against the complainants had they not deprived themselves of the right to object to its constitutionality.

In

Van Hook v. Whitlock, creditors of an insurance company
incorporated in 1805, sued the stockholders, who were under
individual liability, for debts contracted prior to the passage of an act of 1814, whereby, upon their insolvency,
insurance companies were declared exempt from personal liability.

Had the complainants not accepted the dividends,

amounting to 51 percent of the debts, after the dissolution of
the company in 1814, the act of that year would have been in
violation of the Constitution of the United States as impairing the obligation of contracts. 66
In Purdy v. People, in 1842, on error from the Supreme
Court, an act of May, 1840, which altered the charter of the
City of New York, succumbed to the constitutional test by a
narrow majority in the Court for the Correction of Errors. 67
Four senators, speaking for that predominantly Democratic
body, and against the Chancellor, held that the constitution
of the state, in Article 7, Section 9, required the assent
of two-thirds of the members of each branch to alter or
renew "any body politic or corporate. 1168

Therefore, the act

"For the Better Organization of the Criminal Courts of the
66 26 Wendell, 43.
67
At this time, under the constitution of 1821, it was
New York's highest court, which consisted of the president
of the Senate, the senators, the Chancellor and the justices
of the Supreme Court.
68
4 Hill, 393.
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City," which excluded the aldermen from sitting as judges of
the Court of General Sessions, and was passed as a simple
majority bill, was unconstitutional.

Denying the

Chancellor's claim that municipal corporations, as public
corporations, were not embraced by the constitutional provision, which was intended to guard against the "too rapid
multiplication of bank charters and the legislative corruption which their creation induced," the court called for a
return to the:
Old and revered doctrine of strict construction - the
only sound and safe doctrine for the government of
either judges or legislators • • • • Nothing can be more
dangerous to our free institutions, or the rights of the
people, than to encourage doubtful interpretations of
the Constitution, contrary to its more plain and natural
import, as understood by the great body of its readers.69
In 1845, the court, challenging the reformist tendencies of the legislature, overturned its political judgment
on the sensitive issue of banks in De Bow v. the People.
The defendant had been convicted in the court below of passing counterfeit bank notes with the intent to defraud the
Bank of Warsaw.

His counsel had charged that no such bank

existed in law, as the general Banking Act of 1838, under
which the associates had intended to become operative as
the Bank of Warsaw, had not been passed by a vote of twothirds of the members of the legislature, and was therefore
invalid.

Bronson, now Chief Justice, held that the defen-

dant was improperly convicted, as there was no such legal
69

4 Hill 398, 419.
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being as the Bank of Warsaw.

Citing Purdy as precedent, he

declared that the two-thirds clause extended to all corporations, as the constitution, "in unequivocal terms," had

declared.

The safety of free institutions, he believed,

depended upon a "strict adherence to the fundamental law,
whatever we may think of the wisdom and expediency of its
provisions"; he would censure any attempt to disregard the
"explicit language" in favour of what some might choose to
consider the "intent and meaning" of the constitution. 70
This "strict adherence" to constitutional safeguards
caused Bronson, in People v. Warner (1845), to declare an
act of 1843, which created the office of clerk of the Court
of Common Pleas for the city and county of New York, null
and void.

The constitution, Article 4, Section 8, of 1821,

he declared, had directed that the position should be filled
as a dual role, by the elected clerk of the city and county.
As the new off ice would be filled by the court, the electors
would be deprived of their right:

"If the office may be

divided, and the duties assigned to two officers, both must
be chosen by the electors of the county.

No other rule will

give full effect to the constitution. 1171
By the time the court ruled on Quakenbush v. Danks
(1845), the use of legal procedures to maximize judicial
authority had become settled technique.

The case concerned

a sheriff's deputy who had been directed, in 1843, to
70

1 Denio, 13, 18.

71

7 Hill, 82.

63

recover from Danks a debt for which he had been judged liable in 1837.

For this reason, his horse and harness, the

only property not covered by the exemption laws passed prior

to 1842, were taken, though he insisted that they were necessary to the support of his family.

In the court below, his

counsel had claimed that under the new Exemption Law of 1842,
all of Danks' property was exempt from sale on execution,
and the jury returned a verdict for him.

Bronson, overturn-

ing this finding, held that the Exemption Law of 1842, "in
general words," was broad enough to cover debts contracted
prior to its passage, but it ought not to be applied to the
cas~

in hand, otherwise "it may be a moral, but it is no

longer the legal duty of the debtor to pay."

A statute

should not be construed retrospectively; the "rule of justice and honesty" required that every law should, if possible, be so interpreted that no wrong would be done.

There-

fore, property subject to execution at the time the debt was
contracted must remain subject to execution until the debt
.
was pai.d • 12 The legislature
"cannot legislate backwards and
annul the force of prior obligations," therefore the
Exemption Law of 1842, when applied to past transactions,
must be set aside. 73
"In the United States," Tocqueville had written, "the
Constitution governs the legislature as much as the private
citizen"; legal tribunals obey the Constitution "in
72

1 Denio, 131.

73

Ibid., 133.
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preference to any law. 1174

Though reflecting a current

understanding of the bench's power to strike down legislative acts, Tocqueville did not undervalue its potential to
subvert legislative supremacy.

Aware that burgeoning parti-

san sentiment gave to their decisions a grave and delicate
character, the courts, claiming allegiance to the
Constitution as the supreme law of the land, developed doctrines for the evaluation of legislation which placed substantive restraints on legislative power.

The great princi-

ples of republican government, higher law and the Bills of
Rights, provided authoritative legal precepts to temper perceived crude and arbitrary legislation.

Where the protec-

tion of minority rights through judicial review promoted
progress according to the judicial conception of social
order and harmony, the judiciary functioned as a restraint
upon Tocqueville's rnajoritarian tyranny.

Vested interests

in property, politics and economic enterprise were safeguarded by the conservative bar to keep the nation loyal to
their notion of America's social identity.
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CHAPTER IV

The Judiciary and Individual Rights
Tocqueville's majoritarian thesis stresses that the
moral authority of the many could, with its subtle conforming pressures, restrain the individual from the development
and expression of novel ideas and uncommon beliefs; that the
presiding sense of the community, cherishing its creed,
would correct and discipline unorthodox opinion, admitting
no dissidence.

Only humanity, reason and justice could shel-

ter the insubordinate freethinker in the moral world, and,
in the political world, vested rights. 1
Yet, if the Constitution withdrew from partisan debate
certain agreed upon essentials, and these, inscribed in the
Declarations of Rights, were defended against encroachment,
was the individual as secure in his civil liberties within
the institutional sphere of judicial authority as
Tocqueville suggested?

As usual, he offered a shrewd

insight into the nature and creative potentialities of the
judicial function:

"Lawyers are attached to public order
2
beyond every other consideration."
This basic assumption
1
2

Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 263-5, 416.
Ibid., 275.
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determines the following four cases.

In the first, a breach

of the spiritual peace was condemned lest it place the harmany of society in jeopardy.
Abner Kneeland is described by a biographer as a
refined and courteous man, of sincerity, courage and purity
of character.

Sometime Baptist and Universalist minister,

translator of the New Testament, and editor of several
Christian papers which championed liberal notions, his religious views had, by 1830, veered towards the extreme, and
he expounded pantheistic beliefs from the podium of the
First Society of Free Inquirers. 3 He was a Jackson man
whose lectures both in person and print drew large audiences. 4

In early 1834, under an act against blasphemy

passed in 1782, Kneeland was indicted for having "unlawfully
and wickedly" published a "scandalous, impious, obscene,
blasphemous and profane libel" on the existence of God in
the Boston Investigator.

Contained in a public letter,

which he had written to a Universalist periodical, it said
in part-:

"Universalists believe in god which I do not; but

believe that their god, with all his moral attributes •
is nothing more than a chimera of their own imagination."
Upon conviction Kneeland appealed, enduring three trials
before Justices Putnam and Wilde, yet remaining in the
3

v,

williarn H. Allison, Dictionary of· America·n Biography,

ii, 457-8.
4

Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice
Shaw, 43.
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shadow of prison.

He made a final plea to the full bench of
5
the Supreme Judicial Court, and his case was heard in 1836.
Acting as his own counsel, Kneeland protested that the

public letter addressed to the Universalists did not constitute a denial of God within the meaning of the statute.

He

had, he said, simply expressed a disbelief, or doubt, in the
6
creed of the Universalists; he was himself a pantheist.
He
was satisfied, however, that the act of 1782 was unconstitutional, for it violated Article 2 of the Declaration of
Rights which safeguarded a subject in his "religious professions and sentiments"; it infringed Article 16, which guarante.ed the right to propagate sentiments in the press,
unless slanderous; it impaired the nation's law of naturalization which gave to all faiths the rights of citizens.
Expressing regret that the defendant had chosen to
represent himself, 7 to the derogation of his case, Chief
Justice Shaw, for the predominantly Unitarian court, sustained Kneeland's conviction.

Though the two-year delay in

handing down the decision had been occasioned by the "intrinsic difficulty attending some of the questions raised in the
5 20 Pick, 206 (1838).
6
Ibid., 207. Kneeland was mindful, it appears, of the
traditional rejection of the atheist's testimony.
7 Ibid., 266: Morton's dissent was based on Wilde's
instructions to the jury in the lower court, which he considered to be a mistaken view of the law. He regretted that
Kneeland, "unversed in some of the distinctions and principles of criminal law," had failed to make use of a "technical form," which would at least have left the door open for
another trial.
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case, and a difference of opinion among the judges, 118 he
believed that there was now "no doubt" that Kneeland's publie letter constituted blasphemy within the meaning of the

statute. 9

Blasphemy, he said, could be described as a "wil-

ful and malicious attempt to lessen man's reverence for God,
by denying his existence, or his attributes as an intelligent creator, governor and judge of men," and the statute
prohibited the "wilful denial of God • • • with an intent
to impair and destroy the reverence due to him." 10 Upon
studying the other parts of Kneeland's publication to discern the motive and intent behind the words, so that the
language would be understood as to its true meaning, it was
his perception that the letter contemplated a denial of the
existence of God rather than an expression of Kneeland's
disbelief in the Universalists' conception of god.

There-

fore, it was to be "taken as proved" that the language was
used with the purpose and design of denying God, and this
gave sufficient grounds for conviction under the statute. 11
It was "somewhat late," suggested Shaw, to question
the validity of the statute. 12 A SO-year record, and recent
re-enactment after careful revision, demanded respect.
Neighbouring states had declared blasphemy to be a crime at
8 20 Pickering, 211.
10 rbid., 213.
12 Ibid., 218.

9 Ibid., 216.
11 Ibid., 217.
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common law, and Kent, in People v. Ruggles

13

had emphasized

the inherent Christianity of the common law which, it was
imputed, Kneeland had now offended.

He was not protected by

Article 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

Nar-

rowing its scope to the common law definition of a free
press, Shaw construed it to mean only an absence of prior
restraint, which left the individual citizen responsible for
all offences committed through language, printed or oral.
Any other construction, he said, would suggest a general
license to pen scandal and calumny or provoke incitement,
and this he deemed absurd, impractical, and inconsistent
with the existence of free government.
Nor could Shaw find in Article 2, which guaranteed
religious liberty, any reason for invalidating the statute,
for its intent was merely to "restrain and punish acts which
have a tendency to disturb the public peace," such as wilfully blaspheming the holy name of God.

It did not prohibit

free discussion for the "honest purpose" of discovering
truth, nor even the "simple and sincere avowal of a disbelief in the existence of a supreme, intelligent being. 1114
In his dissent, Justice Morton, Democrat, civil
13 Johnson's Repo·rts (New York) 290 ( 1811) • Ruggles
was a "toper in New York who, being ejected from a tavern,
stood in the street and shouted that Jesus Christ was a bastard and Mary a whore," which Chancellor Kent regarded as an
outrage upon public decorum. Open blasphemy, he said, which
reviled the religions professed by almost the whole community, was inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state:
Miller, The ·Life of the Mind in America, 194.
14
20 Pickering, 221.
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libertarian and Baptist, focused upon Kneeland's contention
that the statute against blasphemy infringed upon freedom of
conscience, of discussion, and of the press.

Yet the power

to declare a statute void, "high, delicate, if not dangerous," demanded great prudence, particularly when such statute had received frequent legislative attention. 15 The
history of the freedom of the press, he declared, suggested
that the framers of the constitution wished to prohibit censorship only by means of previous restraints, and no immunity from liability for injuries inflicted on others was
offered.

From the formation of the government of

Massachusetts, libels had been deemed to be crimes, and punished "by virtue of a constitutional adoption of the common
law," therefore it was his intention to accept the constitutionality of the law, and await the voice of the people
through the legislative channel in a definition of those who
disturbed the peace with malicious falsehoods, or obscene or
profane publications or exhibitions. 16
Article 2, Morton believed, secured to the individual
freedom to worship God according to his conscience, provided
that he did not disturb the public peace, and the right to
advocate and disseminate his thoughts, if they did not wound
the feelings of others.

This "clearly [did] not include

atheists," whose sentiments and expressions could hardly be
called religion.
15

Yet a broad view, which sanctioned the

Ibid., 227.

16

20 Pickering, 233.
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protection of all beliefs and disbeliefs upon the subject of
religions could honour the natural transformations of faith,
17
for which man was responsible to the Deity alone.
These two articles, therefore, guaranteed, in his view,
the right of every citizen to "form, enjoy and promulgate
such opinions upon any subject as his own judgment shall diet a t e. .. 1a

Any law which punished a denial of God couched in

language inferring a bad intent to wound feelings and corrupt principles, must be deemed constitutional.

A

"wilful"

denial was not of itself blasphemy, for wilful meant intentional or, at worst, obstinacy, and "every person has a constitutional right to discuss the subject of God and to
affirm or deny his existence."

To constitute a crime,

"there must be an infringement of the rights of others and a
malicious purpose. 1119

Criminality depended upon construe-

tive intent.
"This conviction," Morton said, "rests very heavily
upon my mind." 2

°

Clearly he feared that the court had been

guilty of religious persecution.

Though he believed

Kneeland's public letter had been correctly interpreted as
an intentional denial of God, this, he was persuaded,
Kneeland had a legal right to do.
Commonwealth v. Blackington (1837) concerned an attempt
by the enemies of temperance reform in Massachusetts to
17

19

Ibid. I 233.

18

Ibid., 244-5.

2 0ibid., 245.

Ibid., 236.
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break government regulation of the liquor trade.

The defen-

dant had been indicted under an 1832 statute for retailing
spiritous liquors without a license.

He contended in the

lower court that he had been a licensed retailer in 1835,
and that the county commissioners, left to their discretion
by law to license as many applicants as they believed the
public good might require, had refused to grant any licenses
the following year.

The effect of this stand, he maintained,

was to restore to every citizen of the county the right to
sell, but the court instructed the jury that the commissioners' neglect did not constitute a legal defence, and the
jury found against him.
The defendant's counsel, Robert Rantoul, argued that
the liquor law was unconstitutional as an invasion of property rights, and as a violation both of the equal privileges clause of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and
the act of 1837.

The Chief Justice rejected the contention

that, where a power was not lawfully exercised by one qualified, it might be legally appropriated by an unqualified
individual.

Neither was the statute of 1832 voided by the

1837 act, which conferred upon the county commissioners the
authority to refuse all licenses, even though it seemed to
infer that, at the time of the offence under indictment,
this power was wanting.

He believed that the statute of

of 1837 was "rather a declaration of what the true meaning

73

of what the former act was, than an enactment introductive
of a new law. 1121
Of greater moment was, however, the objection to the
liquor license laws as contrary to the constitution of the
Commonwealth.

Cognizant as he was, that the judicial depart-

ment was clearly vested with the power of review, it would
be utilized only with "great caution and deliberation. 1122
For the state's constitution establishing as it did a few
fundamental principles to guide each department in the fulfilment of its functions, and securing through the
Declaration of Rights a social order long enjoyed under a
government "nearly as free, and practically nearly as popular, as the lot of humanity would admit," had invested in
the legislature the:
Full power and authority to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws • • •
not repugnant to the constitution • • • as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth •
• • • The power is the general rule, the restraint of it
the specific exception.23
In discussing, therefore, those natural rights which
the defendant believed had been circumscribed, Shaw declared
that laws, designed to "define, secure and give practical
efficacy" to the right to acquire and possess property,
which had been a subject of legislative solicitude since the
first settlement of the country, imposed salutary regulations to benefit or protect commerce and trade, through
21
23

12 Pickering, 352.
Ibid., 356-7.

22 12 Pickering, 356.
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which property was procured, and had never been deemed
unconstitutional.

All inspection and licensing laws were of

this nature, made "with a view to revenue, to health, to
peace and good morals"; spiritous liquors, though not necessarily immoral, tended to "immorality, or other mischief or
inconvenience to the community or to individuals. 1124 Neither did the licensing laws infringe the exclusive privileges clause of the Declaration of Rights, for these franchises were granted for services and duties "rendered at the
times and in the manner most beneficial to the public,"
which meant that the security, morals and good order of the
community were promoted.

This "obvious purpose" rendered it
free from any censure in the context of vested rights. 25
In Commonwealth v. Jailer of Alleghany County (1838),

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, interpreting the constitutional guarantee of the 14th section of the state's
Declaration of Rights, that the "privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless where in case of
rebellion or invasions the public safety may require it,"
refused the privilege to a prisoner deemed still infectious
from small pox.

Stating that the purpose of the section was

"to prevent wilful and oppressive delay," the court believed
that it was serving the legitimate needs of society by raising an exception to the "letter of the act:
24 Ibid., 357.

25 Ibid., 358.

"A court is not
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bound to peril life in an attempt to perform what was not
• d o f i"t • n26
intend e d to b e require
In Maxon v. Annas (1845), the Chief Justice of New
York's Supreme Court refused the "tranquilizing sustenance1127 of a Sunday law to a Seventh Day Baptist.

In the

lower court, where the trial was held on a Saturday, a judgment was rendered against the plaintiff for damages, and his
wagon and cutter were sold.

Bronson, in construing the statute of 1839, "In relation to the Seventh Day Baptists," 28
found that, though the law protected the plaintiff from any
"writ, process, warrant, order, judgment, decree or other
proceeding of any court," he was not sheltered from judgment
that was rendered:

"The rendition is a very different thing
from the execution of a judgment." 29 Though, at the common
law, Sunday was dies

~

judicus, and though a state law

declared that no court could transact business on Sunday
except to receive a verdict or discharge a jury, no such
requirements pertained to Saturday.

If the process in the

lower court was made returnable at a time when the defendant
could not conscientiously attend to make his defence, the
plaintiff deserved the "serverest censure," but the judgment
could not be voided. 30
26 7 Watts, 366.
27 Mark De Wolfe Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness:
Religions and Government in American Constitutional History
(Chicago, 1965), 96.
28 1 D
29 Ibid., 206.
_ enio,
"
205 •
30

1 Denio, 207.
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By using the principle of

non-establistu~ent

in the

religious guarantee clause, an assurance that liberty would
not be infringed, the court could have made an effort to

safeguard Maxon's spiritual commitment to his creed, but
freedom of religion was not to be understood as a philosophical absolute.

Even as the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus, the most basic of all protections against the authority of the state, was subject to interpretation, the courts
could, in their decisions, substantially influence both the
structure and atmosphere of democratic life.
Americans, Tocqueville had written, acknowledged the
moral authority of the reason of the community as they
acknowledge the political authority of the mass of the citizens, and "they hold that public opinion is the surest arbiter of what is lawful or forbidden, true or false. 1131 Yet,
the power of the majority was itself not unlimited--"above
it in the political world [are] vested rights. 1132 Further,
the judge was "most strictly bound" to obey the Constitution,
which was the "origin of all authority
the first of
laws. 1133 These four cases suggest, however, that
Tocqueville, despite his intimate knowledge of, and insights
into, the capabilities and caprices of lawyers, had misjudged the willingness of the bench, "the most powerful
31 Tocqueville, D'emoc·racy in America, I, 393.
32
33 Ibid., 100-1.
·Ibid., 416.
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existing security against the excesses of democracy," 34 to
protect minority rights against majoritarian views which the
judges shared.

Herein lies the proof--and the paradox--of

Tocqueville's majoritarian thesis.

34 Ibid., 273.

CHAPTER V

Conclusion
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the doctrine
of judicial review had matured; general public acquiescence
therein appears to have been attained.

The power equation

between legislature and judiciary had been subtly reshaped.
Why?

Despite its auspicious beginnings as the primary
department of government in the early decades after the
Revolution; despite the enlightened accomplishment of constitutions and bills of rights, and the momentum gained in this
creative period, the potential of legislative promise was
unfulfilled.

Though there were leaders of exceptional abil-

ity, such as Calhoun and Webster, the mass of legislators
justified Tocqueville's complaint that the race of American
statesmen had dwindled. 1 Because the preparation of bills
was delegated to legislative committees, a system, as
Tocqueville had noted, which lacked method and continuity,
legislation was often imperfect, and amendments and supplements created confusion and uncertainty.

Special

1
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 200, 204: "On
entering the House of Representatives at Washington, one is
struck by the vulgar demeanour of the great assembly • • •
its members are almost all obscure individuals."
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legislation, which raised questions about the separation of
powers, and dubious influence, gave rise to much litigation,
and led to provisions in state constitutions to prohibit or
limit its use. 2

Scepticism of legislators who, unemcumbered

by scruples, embarked upon extravagant internal improvement
schemes which led to the financial collapse of several
states following the panic of 1837, transformed the attitudes of many regarding the proper use of public credit, and
led to the drafting of new constitutions in the 1840's.
Tocqueville's majority, therefore, searching for a workable
solution through the medium of constitutional conventions,
placed substantial limitations upon legislative discretion,
and, to diffuse political authority, increased the number of
elected officials, including judges, subjecting themselves,
as Tocqueville would say, to the necessity of "refining
[their] discretion and improving [their] choice." 3
The determinate illustration of the failure of the
legislature as the crucible of the people's will lies in the
collapse of the codification movement.

During this, the for-

mative era, when it was deemed necessary to give effect to
the maxims of the common law which, in large part, had been
incorporated in the national and state constitutions,
2

Pound, The Formative Era of American Law, 53-4, 65-8.

3
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 205. The indirect election of the senate appealed to him. He felt that
it would avoid the risk of "perishing miserably amongst the
shoals of democracy." See also Kelly and Harbison, The
American Constitution, 322-3.
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codification, Roscoe Pound believed,could only be accomplished efficaciously after an era of legal maturity, "which
was still well in the future. 114

Though some few codes

received legislative sanction in the 1830's, in general they
lost out to "the lawyers' desire to monopolize a profitable
mystery." 5 The future lay in judicial finding rather than
the legislative declaration of law in codes.
Though the Democracy had created the framework for the
egalitarian revolution, and had captured the public mind,
the reactionary thrust of Democratic social belief
obstructed the impulse of popular rule.

Pursuing the

Jeffersonian myth of a simple, frugal goverrunent, the
party's commitment to minimum administration hindered the
regulation and supervision of the public's subsidies in
4Pound, The Formative Era of American Law, 154, 3: He
dates the formative era from the establishment of the
Constitution to the Civil War.
5Miller, The Life of the Mind in America, 253. Haar,
in The Golden Age of American Law, 232, quotes a member of
Kentucky's constitutional convention in 1849, who protested
the "great expense" of codification incurred in the State of
Louisiana, but this argument was probably spurious. Of more
moment was the determination of the legal profession to protect its vested interest in special knowledge and procedures;
the suggestion that no established legal rules could be so
perfect that they could be preserved in changing social conditions, that the law was already too technical for Everyman
to be his own lawyer, and that the common law was sufficiently systematized (and depoliticized) by the great commentaries, which, in Pound's view, were the "stabilizing agency"
of change. Pound, The Formative Era, 143. Of course, the
rift between slave and free states augmented the obstacles
in the way of general codification, for code provisions,
once enacted, would represent absolute values, which would
be held binding. To bury national peculiarities within a
general formula appeared to be impossible.
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.
.
6
private
en t erprise.

Further, determination to resist

reforms from the North caused pro-slavery Democrats to check
the momentum towards universal white male suffrage in the
South, 7 and to organize congressional "gag" resolutions in
1836. 8

Philosophical sensitivities regarding the inherent

inequality of persons not only inevitably opposed the extension of the vote to Northern blacks, but completed, in 1844,
the undemocratic tendency to remove the suffrage from
women. 9
Nor was the era's supposed egalitarianism reflected in
the president's conception that, as the national leader,
political predominance belonged to him.
vides a crucial example.

The bank veto pro-

Though he correctly perceived

6wallace D. Farnham, "the Weakened Spring of
Government," American Historical Review, 68 (1963), 662-80,
where he discussed the lack of a defined policy towards
emerging issues. However, the people's representatives were
no less eager, on occasion, to still the popular voice, for,
seeking to stimulate economic development in five states in
1830-5, they suppressed the popular role in the assessment
of damages arising out of public works by eliminating the
jury: Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 143.
7schwartz, The Law in America, 45: For instance, giving to the conservatives, led by the aged John Marshall, a
victory in the Virginia Convention of 1839-40.
8
Hyman and Wiecek, Equal Justice under the Law, 9, to
muzzle abolitionists.
9
Edward Pessen, Jacksonian America, Society,
Personality and Politics (Chicago, 1969), 87: Women possessed the vote in the first years of the Revolution in several states. The Jacksonian era witnessed the deprivation
of this right in state after state, ending with New York in
1844. Ibid., 322: The Van Burenites in New York "took the
lead in modifying the state constitution to make it close to
impossible that any citizen of color would vote." Ninetythree percent of Northern blacks lived in states which
deprived them of the suffrage.
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Jackson to be both the master and servant of the Democratic
party, Tocqueville believed that he would not forfeit his
political position by imprudently elevating the executive

role. 10

In this he was wrong.

Realizing the potential

latent in the executive office, Jackson evolved a new conception of presidential authority and new instruments of power
over the people by his use of the veto, by his position as
party leader, and by his control of appointments and removals.

Similarly, popular influence in the major parties was

"more nominal than real": state political machines were
essentially impervious to the people's control. 11
The traditionalism of the political establishment in
Washington, and its espousing of the ideology of laissez
faire and rugged individualism, determined the fundamental
failure of the Democracy to shape the course of economic
development during crucial transition years.

This individu-

alist, activist bias of Jacksonianism, with its stress on
the free, responsible will of the individual in a challenging social and physical environment, limited the authority
of government to interfere with the autonomy of private decision makers.

Indeed, preference for the delegation of power

over the general public appeared "natural to the times. 1112
Great distances and federalism, scarce cash and problems
10 Tocquevi·11 e, Democracy in
. America,
.
I, 413-4.
11 p

.. . America,
.
340 •
essen, J•ac k sonian

12
Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in
Nineteenth Century United States, 65.
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over a tax base, and the Democracy's failure to fashion an
efficient bureacracy because of the Spoils System (itself
hardly democratic), invited the development of a variety of
unofficial practical solutions, and the commission of author.
.
ity
to private
groups t o provi.d e f or communi•t y nee d s. 13
At a time when men turned their prime energies away
from public policy to private affairs; at a time of high
social mobility, when there were few depressed groups without any prospect of bettering their condition, 14 the courts
were available to provide legal tools and procedures to
enforce valid agreements.

More continuously in session than

the legislatures, and with better trained and disciplined
personnel, insulated from special interest pressures by
tenure, (still the norm in some states, though waning), they
created the framework for coherent economic planning, a role
justified while private interest fulfilled essential public
needs.
A range of procedural changes affecting the functioning of the courts had swept away dead forms, facilitating
practice, though some, as the changing role of the jury
demonstrates, decreased the participation of the people in
13
After the Whiskey Rebellion and the house tax riots
in Pennsylvania, the government was cautious about employing
its fiscal power. See Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II,
109-110, where he discussed the formation of associations to
serve societal needs.
14
Ibid., II, 136-8, 141, 156-7, 243-5.
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the judicial process. 15

Legal education, with its prolifer-

ation of schools, court records and periodicals enabled the
bench to achieve high standards of intellectual eminence,
and to secure a favourable public image.

Commentaries and

doctrinal writings by teachers such as Kent and Story gave
to the courts, at a critical period, authoritative statements on the common law, and provided the basis of a taught
tradition, fixing the reception of the common law for all
jurisdictions, except one. 16 Judicial development of the
common law as based on the natural law concept of a universal ideal form of law, permitted the courts to present the
Constitution as a model political

text~

judicial deference

to the common law doctrine of supremacy of the law, and to
the Constitution as the creation of the genius of the
American people, enhanced its disciplinary power. 17 By
means of judicial empiricism, judges gave content to
abstract constitutional precepts, and procedural forms, and
judged legislative activities thereby.
In using law to regulate behavior and shape the environment during a period of transition from pioneer, agricultural to urban, industrialized America, the courts applied
an individualist ideal of society, favourable to private
individual and group liberty, with rare exceptions.
15

This,

Haar, The Golden Age of American Law, 200.

16
Pound, The Formative Era of American Law, 144, 151.
That one was Louisiana.
17

Ibid., 105, 108.
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coinciding with the strain of Jacksonian idealism which had
emphasized the social desirability of free individual decision and self-assertion, gave vitality to the use of law to
promote private entrepreneurial activities.

After the Civil

War a major shift in economic and political power at the
~pense

of the farmer, the worker and the consumer would

',

make a mockery of democratic authority and aspirations.

The

work ethic, upon which the nation had been reared, which
sanctified individual economic achievement, would be prostituted by those who were able to exploit the avenues of
wealth afforded by this fluid, competitive society.
It is in the formative era, as these cases demonstrate,
that judges, perceiving themselves to be the ideological
heirs of the founding fathers, "imposed their own views of
proper economic and social policy upon the nation." 18 In
the process, though they provided the mechanism whereby
minorities might overturn the political judgments of the
majority, as Tocqueville's majoritarian theory had suggested,
they failed to protect manifestations of individualism dissociated from traditional beliefs about correct conduct, no
matter that these were sheltered by the Bills of Rights.
Behavior deemed reprehensible, deviant or blasphemous
received no legal sanction from conservative courts committed to social order, but not to civil liberties.

This,

Tocqueville had not foreseen.
18
1185.

Nelson, "Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review,"
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The Frenchman's distinctive contribution to the philosophy of democracy, it must be remembered, was intended
for a European audience.

If his majoritarian thesis, with

its dark forebodings that challenged the workability of the
elective principle, appears to be a simplistic formula,
which did not adequately explain the contradictory pressures
that operated in American society at any given moment, its
conclusions addressed the profound issues which deeply troubled his countrymen as they weighed the prospects of further
revolutionary changes.
Neither his emphasis on the power of the majority, nor
the indispensability of judicial authority as a neutralizing
agent, were sustained by another nineteenth century political analyst.

The Jacksonian, Frederick Grimke, writing in

the mid-1840's, stressed that public opinion, broadly based,
offered a guarantee of stability through the balance of competing forces in government and society, especially politi19
cal parties:
universal manhood suffrage diffused political
authority.

He believed that the judicial department had a
"disproportionate share of importance," 20 and, his years on

the Ohio Supreme Court having convinced him of the fallibility of the judicial character, he feared the elevation of
judges above community surveillance, with the consequent
encouragement of a dangerous gap between judicial doctrines
19Frederick Grimke, The Nature and Tendency of Free
Institutions, ed. John w. Ward (Cambridge, 1958).
20
Ibid., p. 438.
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and evolving social needs.

If they were to be accountable

to the public, judges should be elected to office for only
such a sufficient number of years that they might demonstrate their competence without losing their dependence upon
21 He saw the institution of the jury as a
.
t h e community.
"wide and salutary influence upon the administration of jus22
tice," a competent and equitable arm of law proceedings.
The return to Tocqueville's hypotheses, however, by an
ultra-conservative political scientist, occurred with the
publication of Francis Lieber's On Civil Liberty and SelfGovernment.

Though he placed far greater emphasis on the

protection of civil rights, he denounced universal manhood
suffrage as leading to "serious misrule," 23 because the veting privilege was not granted upon the basis of property:
"We seek for a criterion which will enable us to distinguish
those who have a fair stake in the welfare of the state from
those who have not. 1124 He believed that the judicial power
ought to be independent, and conservative, for judges were
"the brakes which prevent the vehicle from descending too
fast on an inclined plane. 1125

In 1859, the elected judici-

ary was, in his opinion, "universally and unqualifiedly a
26
serious failure";
the confidence of the people in the
21 Ibid., 449-62.

22 Ibid., 463-4.

23F rancis
. Lie
. b er, On Civil Liberty and Self-Government,
ed. Theodore D. Woolsey (New York, 1972), 262.
24
25 Ibid., 226.
Ibid., 173.
26
Ibid., 233-4.

88

judicial system had decreased, with a consequent decline in
esteem for the jury system.

Yet the institution had its

positive aspects, for it "enables plain, common and practical sense properly to administer itself with keen professional and scientific distinction," providing a school of
h"ip. 27
. .
f ree citizens

The principle that political power should be exercised
subject to fundamental limitations embodied in a written constitution is an American tradition which reaches as far back
as the Mayflower Compact.

Constitutional guarantees give

notice that ideals of justice and liberty lie within a protective shelter.

Nevertheless, as has been demonstrated,

the courts could deliberately dispossess perceived aberrant
individuals of civil liberties deemed cumbrous and untimely.
All of these cases throw into bold relief the magnitude of
the judicial policy-making power, a perplexing question
which speaks to the legitimacy of judicial review.

Though,

by tacit consent of the people, this power is accepted, it
ought always to be remembered that Bills of Rights, albeit
self-imposed, are not self-enforcing.

"The true friends of

the liberty and the greatness of man," wrote Tocqueville,
"ought constantly to be on the alert to prevent the power of
government from lightly sacrificing the private rights of
individuals to the general execution of its designs." 28
27 . b
. ·1 Li"berty an d Se lf-Government, 233 - ...
,,
Lie er, 0 n Civi

28

Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II, 327.
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